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Note
Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott:
Who Should Swallow the Bitter Pill of the
Exclusionary Rule? The Supreme Court Passes the
Cup
I. INTRODUCTION
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding .... [I]t is better that
a few criminals escape than that the privacies of life of all the people
be exposed to the agents of the government, who will act at their own
discretion, the honest and the dishonest, unauthorized and unrestrained
by the courts. 
1
"The right to be let alone," Justice Brandeis recognized, is indispen-
sable in any civilized society. 2 The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution secures that right by prohibiting "unreasonable
searches and seizures." 3 The Amendment, however, contains no ex-
plicit remedy for violations of a person's right to be free from unreason-
able searches. 4 Instead, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted
an exclusionary rule that prohibits the government from using evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 5
Over the past twenty-five years, however, Supreme Court decisions
have diminished the scope of the exclusionary rule. 6 In Pennsylvania
Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott ("Scott Il"), the Supreme Court
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 & n.12 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Id. at 478.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See id.
5. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). The Weeks Court held that "[i]f letters and private documents can thus be seized
and held and used in evidence against a citizen.., the protection of the Fourth Amendment... is
of no value .... " Id. at 393.
6. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary
rule did not apply to grand jury proceedings); see also infra Parts IIB-C (explaining the devel-
opment of restrictions upon the exclusionary rule).
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examined the applicability of the exclusionary rule in the context of a
parole revocation hearing. 7  The Court held that the exclusionary rule
was not applicable in parole revocation hearings because its application
would not deter unconstitutional searches. 8 As a result, the protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment continued to deteriorate as the
Court carved another exception to the application of the exclusionary
rule.
9
This Note examines the history of the exclusionary rule, discussing
both the development of the rule as well as the implicit and explicit pur-
poses for its application. 10 This Note then categorizes the limitations
that the United States Supreme Court has placed upon the exclusionary
rule in the past twenty-five years.'1 Against this historical foundation,
this Note discusses the decision in Scott III, which'declined to apply the
exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings.12 This Note then criti-
cizes the logic of the majority and expands upon Justice Souter's dis-
sent. 13  Next, this Note analyzes the negative impact of the decision,
emphasizing how its distinct limitation on the exclusionary rule curtails
Fourth Amendment rights. 14  This Note concludes by suggesting that
future decisions should reexamine the original purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule. 15
7. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2017-18 (1998)
[hereinafter Scott III]. In Scott III, parole officers arrested Keith Scott, a recent parolee, for sus-
pected violations of his parole. See id. at 2018. Without any search warrant, several of the offi-
cers then went to Mr. Scott's mother's house, where he had been staying, and searched both Mr.
Scott's private quarters and the common areas of the house. See id.
8. See id. at 2022.
9. See id. at 2023 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in the context of parole
revocation hearings). The majority did not consider the officers' knowledge of Scott's parole
status a salient point. See id. at 2021-22 (declining to adopt a "piecemeal approach" to the exclu-
sionary rule). On the other hand, the parole officers' knowledge of Scott's parole status was an
important fact in the reasoning of the Souter dissent. See id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting); see
also infra Part III.E (detailing the rationale of Justice Souter's dissent in Scott 111).
10. See infra Part l.A.
11. See infra Parts f.B-C.
12. See infra Part lI.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part VI.
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II. BACKGROUND
The exclusionary rule emerged and developed slowly.' 6 Formally
created, judicially, in 1914,17 it was not made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment until 1961.18 This part of the Note
charts the emergence of the exclusionary rule in the early twentieth
century.19 It next traces the rule's growth and expansion through the
middle of the century.2 0  Finally, it examines the restrictions placed
upon the rule over the past twenty-five years z.2  Throughout this section,
there is a particular focus on the reasons, both implicit and explicit, that
various Courts have used as the basis for defining the scope of the ex-
clusionary rule.2
A. Development of the Exclusionary Rule
On the heels of the Revolutionary War, James Madison expressed
concern that any new government would only recreate the deplorable
conditions that the war was fought to avoid.23 The Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution afforded some protection for Madi-
son's concerns, 24 providing that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
16. See infra Part IIA-B.
17. See infra Part H.A.; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
18. See infra Part H.A.; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
19. See infra Part H.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part H.C.
22. See infra Part H.A-C.
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madi-
son wrote:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place, oblige it to control itself.
Id.
24. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE xiv (3d ed. 1996) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment occupies "a place second to none in the Bill of Rights") (quoting Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1983) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment ensured that citizens' liberty interests would not be jeopardized by the post-
revolution government's use of either the general warrant or the writ of assistance); Cheryl De-
shaies, Note, Vermont's Misplaced Application of the Closely Regulated Industry Exception to the
Warrant Requirement Under Article Eleven, 21 VT. L. REV. 1201, 1205-06 (1997) (discussing
the Framers' primary rationale for developing the Fourth Amendment).
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their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated. 25
The Fourth Amendment, however, did not provide any explicit rem-
edy to prevent such searches. 26 Nevertheless, Madison, in his address to
the First Congress, envisioned the judiciary as the guardians of the Bill
of Rights.27 Despite Madison's plea, for more than a century after the
ratification of the Bill of Rights, neither the Supreme Court nor Con-
gress created any remedy that would prevent unreasonably seized evi-
dence from being admitted at trial.28 Indeed, through the nineteenth
century, the improper seizure of evidence did not affect its admissibil-
ity.2
9
This changed in 1914 with the Supreme Court decision Weeks v.
United States, in which the Court held that the admission of improperly
seized evidence implicates the Fourth Amendment. 30  Coincident to an
arrest, government officials broke down the doors of Freemont Weeks's
home and seized numerous papers as evidence of the illegal sale of lot-
tery tickets. 31 After the trial court denied Weeks's petition for the re-
25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in full that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
26. See I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.1(a), at 3-7; John A. Wasowicz, Exclusionary Rule: A
20th Century Invention, TRIAL, Feb. 1998, at 79 (noting that the exclusionary rule was an early
twentieth century invention); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (omitting any express remedy to
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures).
27. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Although the Bill of Rights had
yet to be ratified, Madison's address suggested their incorporation into the Constitution. See id.
at 447-59.
28. See Wasowicz, supra note 26, at 79. In 1886, the Supreme Court decided that the gov-
ernment could not compel a defendant to produce papers that would incriminate him. See Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886). Although today this would have been decided under
the rubric of the Fifth Amendment, the Court reasoned that compelling the production of papers
was a seizure and, thus, decided the case under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 630; see also
Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 261, 263 (1998).
29. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 283-84 (John William Strong ed., 1992) (stating that such
evidence was admitted to accurately receive lawsuits and to avoid presumed costly and time-
consuming inquiries).
30. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (adopting the exclusionary rule to pre-
vent introduction of illegally seized evidence at trial), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
31. See id. at 387-88. The officers "seized all of his books, letters, money, papers, notes, evi-
dences of indebtedness, stock, certificates, insurance policies, deeds, [and] abstracts... I" d. at
387.
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turn of his property, Weeks appealed to the Supreme Court.32 The
Court noted that the Fourth Amendment placed limitations upon the ex-
ercise of power by federal officials. 33 In addition, the Court reasoned
that the people looked to the judiciary as the body to protect their fun-
damental rights. 34 Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that absent
a judicial remedy for unwarranted government behavior, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment "might as well be stricken from the Constitu-
tion." 35 Accordingly, the Court held that seizure of evidence in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment rendered that evidence inadmissible. 36
Thus, the exclusionary rule was born.
37
The subsequent development of the exclusionary rule not only filled
the holes left by the Weeks decision but also clarified the purpose of the
rule. 38 Although the exclusionary rule prevented the government from
introducing evidence at trial, nothing prohibited the government from
using illegally obtained evidence 39 in other ways, such as to further an
investigation. 40  Justice Holmes, however, soon wrote that the exclu-
sionary rule not only prohibited the use of illegally obtained evidence at
32. See id. at 389. After the seizure, Weeks petitioned for the return of his property, asserting
that the seizure of his property was in violation of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See id.
Before the trial, the court directed the District Attorney to return only the property that was unre-
lated to the charges Weeks faced. See id. The District Attorney retained several papers, includ-
ing a number of lottery tickets and statements with reference to the lottery. See id. at 388-89.
33. See id. at 391-92. The Court noted that Fourth Amendment protection applied to "all
alike, whether accused of crime or not... " Id. at 392. In addition, the Court reasoned that even
the laudable effort of imposing liability on those guilty of crimes should not override the consti-
tutional protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 393.
34. See id. at 392; see also infra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Clark's
view that judicial integrity is crucial to the survival of government). Although this language pro-
vides some support that notions of judicial integrity necessitate the exclusionary rule, Justice
Stewart has stated that this justification is problematic. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1382-83.
Rather, Justice Stewart comments that the rule is a "required constitutional remedy." See id. at
1384.
35. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
36. See id. at 398.
37. See id. Nevertheless, the Court stated no explicit purpose for its introduction of the exclu-
sionary rule. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1372. Justice Stewart noted that the exclusionary
rule was not the product of debate over the justification for the exclusionary rule. See id. Nev-
ertheless, the language contained in the Weeks opinion supports both the theory that the exclu-
sionary rule serves a deterrent purpose, and the theory that it is a necessary product of judicial
integrity. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92. For a discussion of the underlying rationale behind the
exclusionary rule, see infra Parts II.A-C.
38. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.1(f), at 18-20 (discussing purposes behind the exclu-
sionary rule); Stewart, supra note 24, at 1372-77 (tracing the development of the exclusionary
rule).
39. Throughout this paper, the author uses the term "illegally obtained evidence" to refer to
evidence that is seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
40. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1375-76.
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trial but also the use of illegally obtained evidence to discover other
evidence-the poisonous fruits doctrine. 4' The Court later extended the
exclusionary rule to allow defendants to request the return of illegally
obtained evidence during, rather than before, trial.42 The Court further
expanded the role of the exclusionary rule as a Fourth Amendment
safeguard when it held that a request of the actual return of illegally
seized evidence was unnecessary to preserve Fifth Amendment rights;
rather, one need only request the exclusion of the evidence at trial.43
Thus, the exclusionary rule began to take form as the "remedy" that
gave meaning to the Fourth Amendment.44
Thirty-five years after the adoption of the exclusionary rule, thirty-
one states continued to reject it. 45 In 1949, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the states to
adopt the exclusionary rule, because the states could instead utilize
other effective remedies, such as the threat of civil suits or interdepart-
41. See Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). In Silverthorne
Lumber Company, the government illegally seized documents from a corporation. See id. at 390.
The government copied these documents and then returned them. See id. at 391. In preparation
for litigation, the government, arguing that Fifth Amendment protections do not apply to corpo-
rations issued a subpoena duces tecum compelling the production of the same documents it had
illegally seized. See id. at 386-87. In response to the government's argument, Justice Holmes
wrote, "[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at
all." Id. at 392; see also Mark S. Bransdorfer, Miranda Right-to-Counsel and the Fruits of the
Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 62 IND. L.J. 1061, 1067-68 (1987) (attributing the creation of the poi-
sonous fruits doctrine to Justice Holmes's opinion in Silverthorne Lumber Company).
42. Compare Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921) (holding that request to re-
turn illegally obtained evidence may be made at trial), overruled in part by Penitentiary v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), with Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398 (holding that a defendant may petition
before trial for return of illegally obtained evidence).
43. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1925). In Agnello, the defendant main-
tained that he had never seen the cocaine that was seized within his house. See id. at 30. Conse-
quently, the Court reasoned that a request by the defendant for the return of the cocaine would
have an incriminatory effect. See id. at 34. Therefore, the Court held that requiring him to make
such a request, in order to exclude the evidence at trial, would violate his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See id.
44. See id. at 35. The Agnello Court stated, "[tihe admission of evidence obtained by the
search and seizure was error and prejudicial to the substantial rights of Frank Agnello." Id.; see
also Norton, supra note 28, at 281. Norton contends that the constitutional underpinnings of the
exclusionary rule arise from Blackstone's proposition that every right has a remedy. See Norton,
supra note 28, at 281 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 109). Likewise, Jus-
tice Stewart noted that, while not constitutionally required, one justification for the exclusionary
rule is that the rule is a "constitutional remedy." See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1384.
45. See Wasowicz, supra note 26, at 80; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 n.7 (1961)
(listing 23 states that had no criminal provisions to control unlawful searches). Indeed, it was not
until 1949 that the Supreme Court expressly held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed the Fourth Amendment limitation on the states. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 28 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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mental training and discipline, to deter Fourth Amendment violations.
46
In 1961, however, the Court reversed its 1949 decision and held that the
Constitution did require the states to adopt the exclusionary rule.47  In
Mapp v. Ohio, the Court held that precisely because alternatives to the
exclusionary rule were ineffective, 48 the Constitution required the states
to adopt the exclusionary rule, both to preserve judicial integrity49 and
to ensure Fourth Amendment guarantees. 50
B. Limitations Upon the Exclusionary Rule: The Origins of the
Balancing Test
Although the Court had presented a relatively clear statement of the
purpose behind the exclusionary rule,5 1 the Court opened the door to a
series of restrictions to the rule with its development of a balancing test
in United States v. Calandra.52 In determining whether the exclusion-
46. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31. The Court noted that internal discipline of police or private ac-
tion could provide equally effective remedies for Fourth Amendment violations. See id. But see
Stewart, supra note 24, at 1384-89. Justice Stewart explained that the decision in Mapp, which
overruled Wolf, essentially determined that no other effective remedies for government violations
of the Fourth Amendment exist-then, or now. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 1384-89. To some extent,
the reasoning in Wolf marks the moment when the "right" and the "remedy" became two distin-
guishable entities. See id. at 1377-78.
47. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657, rev'g Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
48. See id. at 652-53. The Mapp Court noted that other remedies were "worthless and futile."
Id. The Court further commented that only 23 states provided criminal provisions aimed at pre-
venting unreasonable searches and seizures. See id. at 652 n.7.
49. See id. at 659. Justice Clark wrote that "[niothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own exis-
tence." Id. Justice Clark concluded that the decision to extend the exclusionary rule to the states
is founded on "reason and truth" and gave the courts the "judicial integrity so necessary in the
true administration of justice." Id. at 660.
50. See id. Justice Clark also noted that the decision to extend the exclusionary rule to the
states gave to the individual "no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him . I..." d
51. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing judicial integrity and the preser-
vation of Fourth Amendment guarantees as rationales for the exclusionary rule).
52. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). As Justice Stewart commented, Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), formed the theoretical basis for the proposition that the exclu-
sionary rule served a deterrent purpose. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1378-79. In 1968, the
Court articulated a theoretical paradigm that strengthened the conceptual limitation upon the ex-
clusionary rule. See Norton, supra note 28, at 270-71 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
In Terry, the Court reasoned that in permitting a search of a suspect whom police reasonably be-
lieve to be armed, an officer would not be deterred by the prospect of future exclusion of evi-
dence, because his concern for his safety would override that interest. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-
30. In 1969, the Court hinted at the development of the balancing test. See Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969); see also Stewart, supra note 24, at 1390 (noting that Alder-
man suggested that "the determination of whether or not to apply the exclusionary rule would
turn on a balancing of the costs and benefits of exclusion"). Specifically, in Alderman, the Court
rejected the notion that "anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the
Fourth Amendment." Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174.
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ary rule should apply in grand jury proceedings, the Calandra Court ex-
plicitly stated that the exclusionary rule served as a punitive deterrent,
preventing unreasonable searches, rather than as a remedy to redress
governmental invasions of privacy.5 3 The Court concluded that the ad-
mission of illegally obtained evidence is not, itself, a violation of the
Constitution.54  Thus, the Court held that the exclusionary rule is not
intended to apply in every context.55
Accordingly, the Court espoused a deterrent, rather than a remedial,
philosophy for the exclusionary rule. 56 As a deterrent, the Court rea-
soned, the rule should be restricted to "those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served. ' '57  To comport with
the exclusionary rule's purported deterrent purpose, the Court devel-
oped a balancing test. This test became the measuring stick for future
limitations of the rule, weighing the high social costs of the rule
58
against the possible deterrent effects of the rule.59 For example, in Ca-
landra, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in a grand jury
53. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (carving out an exception to the exclusionary rule in the
context of grand jury proceedings). In Calandra, the Court stated that "the rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id. at 348. If the pur-
pose of the rule were to act as a remedy, the exclusionary rule would operate to restore the status
quo before the unconstitutional search. See Norton, supra note 28, at 284. On the other hand, if
the exclusionary rule served a deterrent purpose, it would operate to provide a punitive sanction
upon the government to prevent unconstitutional searches. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
54. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. Rather, the Court stated that "[t]he wrong condemned is
the unjustified governmental invasion.., of an individual's life." Id.
55. See id. at 348.
56. See id. The dissent in Calandra opposed the majority's characterization of the function of
the exclusionary rule. See id. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather than serving a deterrent
effect, the dissent argued that the exclusionary rule is a product of the judiciary's role as the
"guardians of the Bill of Rights" designed to "give content and meaning to the Fourth Amend-
ment's guarantees." Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 348. The Court has frequently invoked this language from Calandra in subsequent
exclusionary rule jurisprudence. See, e.g., Scott III, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1998) (stating that the
exclusionary rule is applied only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served ....") (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041
(1984) (stating that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter) (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at
347); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984) (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1976) (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 446 (1976) (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
58. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349. In this instance, the Court referred to the potential injury
to the historic role of the grand jury. See id. It reasoned that the application of the rule would
hinder the fact-finding function of grand juries, unnecessarily lengthen grand jury proceedings,
and alter the traditionally informal nature of grand jury proceedings. See id. at 349-50.
59. See id. at 350-52.
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proceeding. 60 In its decision, the Court reasoned that because the evi-
dence would not be admissible during a criminal trial, the deterrent ef-
fect would not be jeopardized if the court declined to apply the rule in a
grand jury proceeding. 61 Also, the Court reasoned that application of
the exclusionary rule would unduly hinder the traditional fact-finding of
grand juries.62 Therefore, because the cost associated with application
of the exclusionary rule outweighed any deterrent benefit that would be
gained from its application, the Court refused to apply the rule.
63
C. Restrictions upon the Exclusionary Rule
The subsequent twenty-five years led to numerous restrictions placed
upon the exclusionary rule.64 These restrictions fall into two distinct
categories: (1) decisions that failed to reach the exclusionary rule by
holding either that there was no search, or that the search was reason-
able;65 and (2) decisions that created exceptions to the exclusionary
60. See id. at 354.
61. See id. at 354-55. The Court's minimization of any deterrent effect of the rule set the
precedent for future limitations. See id. at 351-52.
62. See id. at 349-52.
63. See id. at 354-55.
64. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (evidence seized as a result of clerical
errors fell within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); Michigan Dep't of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints for motorists do not violate Fourth
Amendment); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 308-09 (1990) (exclusionary rule does not apply to
evidence used to impeach a criminal defendant); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)
(diminished definition of reasonable suspicion); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537
(1988) (exclusionary rule does not apply if evidence discoverable through independent source);
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (exclusionary rule does not apply to evi-
dence found in curbside trash, because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy);
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1985) (diminished expectation of
privacy at international border); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (public school
students have diminished expectation of privacy); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051
(1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation hearings); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 922 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply if officers conducted search in good faith reli-
ance on warrant); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 816 (1984) (restricting the poisonous
fruits doctrine); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply if
discovery of evidence was inevitable); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (exclu-
sionary rule may not be applied to assert violation of another person's Fourth Amendment rights);
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149-50 (1978) (exclusionary rule may not be applied when there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278-79
(1978) (exclusionary rule does not exclude testimony of witness discovered through illegally ob-
tained evidence); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976) (roadblocks to
search for illegal aliens do not violate Fourth Amendment); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
459-60 (1976) (exclusionary rule does not apply in civil tax proceedings); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence that would have
been found without illegally obtained evidence).
65. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 (random sobriety roadblocks do not violate Fourth Amendment);
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41 (search of trash by the curb is not a search); Montoya de Hernan-
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rule. 66 The effect of these two categories is markedly different.67
1. Absence of an Unreasonable Search
As a threshold matter, before a court reaches the exclusionary rule, it
must find that there was a search and that the search was unreason-
able. 68 If there was no search or if the search was reasonable, then the
exclusionary rule does not apply, because the government has not vio-
lated any Fourth Amendment right.6
9
The Supreme Court has held that certain kinds of governmental ac-
tions are not searches at all. 70 For example, a police officer who seizes
dez, 473 U.S. at 539 (expectation of privacy at international borders diminished); T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 341 (students at public schools have diminished expectation of privacy); Payner, 447 U.S.
at 735 (exclusionary rule may not be applied to assert violation of another person's Fourth
Amendment rights); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149-50 (exclusionary rule may not be applied when there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy).
66. See James, 493 U.S. at 308-09 (exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence used to im-
peach a criminal defendant); Murray, 487 U.S. at 537 (exclusionary rule does not apply if evi-
dence discoverable through independent source); Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051 (exclusionary
rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (exclusionary rule does
not apply if officers conducted search in good faith reliance on warrant); Nix, 467 U.S. at 448
(exclusionary rule does not apply if discovery of evidence was inevitable); Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at
278-79 (exclusionary rule does not exclude testimony of witness discovered through illegally ob-
tained evidence); Janis, 428 U.S. at 459-60 (exclusionary rule does not apply in a federal civil tax
proceeding); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491 (exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence that would
have been found without illegally obtained evidence).
67. See infra Part II.C.1-2 (discussing the two classes of restrictions upon the exclusionary
rule).
68. See I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 2.1, at 379-81 (discussing limitations of the Fourth
Amendment). Interestingly, the Scott III Court declined to rule on the issue of whether the search
of Scott's mother's residence was a reasonable search. See Scott I1, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 n.3
(1998). As a condition of his parole, Scott had signed a consent form authorizing the parole offi-
cers to conduct a search of his person or residence at any time without a warrant. See id. at 2018.
Justice Thomas declined to dissect the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion to determine
whether its holding that the consent form was invalid was based upon the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion or the United States Constitution. See id. at 2019 n.3. Instead, Justice Thomas addressed
only the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied. See id; see also The Supreme Court,
1997 Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 182, 188-89 (1998) [hereinafter Harvard Arti-
cle] (criticizing the Court for failing to provide an answer to the preliminary question of whether
the search was reasonable). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, stated explicitly that its
decision was premised "solely upon federal constitutional grounds." Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of
Probation and Parole, 698 A.2d 32, 39 n. 13 (Pa. 1997) [hereinafter Scott I1].
69. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 2.1(a), at 379-81 (discussing limitations of the Fourth
Amendment). Included in this category are cases where the Court refused to apply the exclusion-
ary rule, because it found that the defendant did not have standing to invoke the rule. See Payner,
447 U.S. at 735 (exclusionary rule may not be applied to assert violation of another person's
Fourth Amendment rights); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149-50; see also 5 LAFAVE, supra note 24, §
11.1 (a), at 2-3 (discussing administration of the exclusionary rule).
70. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (repudiating the "inadvertent dis-
covery" requirement of Coolidge v. New Hampshire); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
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objects in his or her plain view has not conducted a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes.7 1 Similarly, the Court has concluded that certain
types of searches are not unreasonable because a diminished expectation
of privacy exists in the particular context.72 In making such a determi-
nation, the Court often balances the Fourth Amendment liberty interest
of the individual against a governmental interest.7 3 Consequently, the
analysis centers upon whether a person's liberty interests are, in fact,
diminished. 74 The danger here is that the rule is difficult to apply and
leaves any court the flexibility to create more exceptions. 75 Further-
more, when a court finds a search to be reasonable because of a dimin-
ished privacy expectation, the result often reduces Fourth Amendment
protections for an entire class of persons-such as students or persons at
international borders.
7 6
In addition, the Court has held that certain kinds of searches and sei-
zures are inherently reasonable.77 As in the cases where a diminished
465 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("[I]t is well established that under certain circumstances the police
may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant, [if discovery was inadvertent]."); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (stating that objects falling in plain view of officers may
be seized); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 2.2, at 396-407 (discussing evolution of the plain
view doctrine).
71. See Harris, 390 U.S. at 236; see also I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 2.2, at 396-407.
72. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988) (search of curbside trash is
not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because there is no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967)); United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1985) (expectation of privacy at international borders diminished);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (public school students have diminished expec-
tation of privacy); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 2.1(b), at 381-86 (discussing the Katz test,
which examines whether a governmental search violated the privacy upon which a person justi-
fiably relied).
73. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41 (1985). In T.L.O., a teacher discovered a student
smoking in a high school bathroom. See id. at 328. Although the student denied that she had
been smoking, the principal searched her purse and found rolling papers. See id. On appeal from
the delinquency hearing, the Court held that although the Fourth Amendment did apply to school
officials, the search in question was reasonable. See id. at 333, 341. The Court, however, held
that a balance must be struck between the student's expectation of privacy and the school's need
to maintain an environment where learning could occur. See id. at 339. In determining this bal-
ance, the Court reasoned that students have diminished liberty interests. See id. at 341.
74. See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41 (holding that the liberty interest was diminished
because the trash was relinquished); Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539 (noting that persons
at international borders have diminished liberty interests); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41 (suggesting
that students have diminished liberty interests).
75. See I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 2.1(b), at 385 & n.72 (citing Note, Protecting Privacy
Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313, 328-29 (1981)).
76. See cases cited supra notes 64-66 (discussing the effect of Court decisions upon the Fourth
Amendment rights of persons at international borders and students); see also infra notes 320-23
and accompanying text (discussing generally the justifications behind Court decisions that create
a class of persons for whom Fourth Amendment protections are lowered).
77. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that random
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expectation of privacy exists, the Court employs a balancing test to de-
termine which kinds of searches are reasonable. 78 The test weighs the
importance of the governmental interest that is served by the search
against the extent of the deprivation of liberty. 79 Generally, these kinds
of searches are minimally intrusive but serve a compelling governmen-
tal interest. 8
0
The important thread throughout these cases is the focus upon the
liberty interest invaded. 81  To comply with the terms of the Fourth
Amendment, either the interest invaded is minimal or the invasion itself
is minimal.82 Thus, when restricting the Fourth Amendment in this
fashion, the Court works directly with the language of the Fourth
Amendment.83
2. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
A second class of limitations upon the Fourth Amendment creates
exceptions to the application of the exclusionary rule. 8 Some of these
exceptions center on the procedural context in which the evidence was
roadblocks to check for drunk drivers do not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (explaining that roadblocks to search for illegal aliens
does not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (sug-
gesting that the reasonableness of a search must depend upon the extent to which the seizure ad-
vances the public interest).
78. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448-49. The Court examined the reasonableness of searches at road-
blocks meant to check for drunk drivers. See id. at 450. The police randomly established road-
blocks and momentarily stopped every driver passing through a designated area. See id. at 448.
The Court balanced the minimal intrusion into the drivers' liberty interest with the magnitude of
the governmental interest in preventing drunk driving. See id. at 451-52.
79. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51 ("Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures in-
volves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual lib-
erty.").
80. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (noting that the governmental interest in reducing drunk driving
was compelling, while the inconvenience of the momentary seizure at the roadblock was mini-
mal).
81. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing diminished expectations of pri-
vacy and diminished liberty interests).
82. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's balancing of indi-
vidual privacy interests and governmental interests).
83. See supra notes 73-76 (discussing the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement);
see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 2.1, at 375 (discussing limitations of the Fourth Amend-
ment).
84. See supra note 66 (listing several cases declining to apply the exclusionary rule).
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seized.85 Other exceptions limit the application of the exclusionary rule
in particular contexts. 8
6
For example, the Court restricted the poisonous fruits doctrine87 by
creating an "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.
88
Thus, where the discovery of evidence would have been inevitable, re-
gardless of the unconstitutional search, the exclusionary rule does not
apply. 89  Likewise, the Court also created a "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule.9° Under the good faith exception, where an offi-
cer conducted a search in good faith reliance upon a search warrant that
appeared valid on its face, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary
rule, even if the warrant later proved to be invalid.91 Under these ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule, the Court inquired into the effective-
ness of the rule.92 Implicit in these exceptions is the assumption that the
85. See. e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (exclusionary rule does not
apply if evidence discoverable through independent source); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
922 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply if officers conducted search in good faith reliance
on warrant); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply if dis-
covery of evidence was inevitable); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1978) (ex-
clusionary rule does not exclude testimony of witness discovered through illegally obtained evi-
dence); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (exclusionary rule does not apply
to evidence which would have been found without illegally obtained evidence).
86. See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 308-09 (1990) (exclusionary rule does not apply
to evidence used to impeach a criminal defendant); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051
(1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings); United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) (exclusionary rule does not apply in federal civil tax proceedings);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule not applicable in grand jury
proceedings).
87. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing the poisonous fruits doctrine, which
prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence to discover other evidence).
88. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491. In Wong Sun, the Court restricted the fruits of the tree
doctrine. See id. After being arrested without probable cause, Wong Sun was released. See id.
Several days later, he returned voluntarily to make a confession. See id. The Court held that,
while the exclusionary rule prevented the introduction of evidence that was found through the use
of illegally seized evidence, the statement had "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."
Id. (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
89. See Williams, 467 U.S. at 448.
90. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21. Under the good faith exception, the exclusionary rule does
not bar evidence seized by police conducting searches in good faith reliance on a search warrant.
See id.; see also James P. Fleissner, Glide Path to an "Inclusionary Rule": How Expansion of the
Good Faith Exception Threatens to Fundamentally Change the Exclusionary Rule, 48 MERCER L.
REv. 1023, 1025-1032 (1997) (discussing the origins of the good faith exception and criticizing
its expansion beyond the Leon facts).
91. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21.
92. See id. at 906. The Court noted that whether the exclusionary rule should apply is "an is-
sue separate from the question [of] whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to
invoke the rule were violated by police conduct." Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
223 (1983)). In cases where a police officer has acted in good faith reliance upon a warrant, the
Court reasons "there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter." Id. at 920-21.
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primary purpose of the rule is to deter unconstitutional searches.93 The
Court employed a balancing test in these contexts, weighing the effec-
tiveness of the rule, rather than the liberty interests of the person ag-
grieved, 94 against the cost of the rule.95
In other instances, the Court limited the application of the exclusion-
ary rule in particular contexts or administrative fora.96 For instance, the
Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hear-
ings97 or civil tax proceedings. 98 To determine whether to create an ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule in a particular context, the Court em-
ploys a balancing test that weighs the effectiveness of the rule against
its costs. 99 Therefore, the Court appraises the costs and benefits of the
rule, not the invaded liberty interest. 100
The recent restrictions upon the exclusionary rule embody a funda-
mental change in judicial philosophy. 1 1 Because the Weeks Court
never explicitly suggested a rationale explaining its creation of the ex-
clusionary rule, 10 2 the rule is subject to shifting judicial philosophies
93. See id. at 906 (describing the purpose of the rule as a deterrent, rather than as a constitu-
tional right) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
94. See supra Part II.C.I (discussing the balancing test employed in cases where the Court
found a search to be reasonable).
95. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21. The Court balanced the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule against the consequences of applying the rule. See id. at 900-01. The Court reasoned that the
exclusionary rule would not deter an officer acting in good faith reliance upon a search warrant
from conducting illegal searches. See id. at 920-21.
96. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 308-09 (1990) (exclusionary rule does not apply to
evidence used to impeach); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984) (exclusionary
rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60
(1976) (exclusionary rule does not apply in federal civil tax proceedings); United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury
proceedings). Indeed, the Scott III Court presents the argument that the parole revocation context
is analogous to these noncriminal and administrative contexts in which it has refused to apply the
rule. See infra Part III.C (discussing the high social costs and limited deterrent effect of imposing
the exclusionary rule).
97. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051. The Court's refusal to apply the exclusionary rule
in civil deportation hearings has the troubling effect of creating a class of persons for whom
Fourth Amendment protections are lessened. See id. at 1045-46; supra notes 72-76 (discussing
other classes of persons for whom Fourth Amendment protections are lessened); infra notes 319-
332 (discussing generally the justifications for decisions that impact Fourth Amendment protec-
tions of classes of persons).
98. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 459-60.
99. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (describing the balancing test used).
100. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (describing the balancing test used).
101. Compare Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (stating that the exclusionary rule serves as a deter-
rent), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-59 (1961) (stating that the exclusionary rule pre-
serves the Fourth Amendment and protects judicial integrity).
102. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of the exclusion-
ary rule).
1999] Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott 83
and models of the criminal justice system. 10 3 As the restrictions upon
the exclusionary rule continue to mount, the theory that the rule serves
only a deterrent purpose becomes more entrenched.10 4
III. DISCUSSION
On June 22, 1998, the Supreme Court decided Scott 111.105 After ar-
resting Keith M. Scott for alleged parole violations, parole officers,
without obtaining a search warrant, searched Scott's home. 10 6  Despite
the warrantless search, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
rule would not bar evidence seized during the unconstitutional search of
Scott's home because application of the exclusionary rule in parole
revocation hearings would not deter future unconstitutional searches. 1
07
A. The Factual Context
On April 2, 1982, a Pennsylvania court sentenced Keith M. Scott to a
ten to twenty year term of imprisonment for third degree murder. 108 On
September 1, 1993, after serving slightly more than his minimum sen-
tence, Scott was released on parole, subject to several conditions.'0 9
Condition 5(b) of Scott's parole required him to refrain from "owning
or possessing any firearms or other weapons." 110  After his release,
Scott resided at the home of his mother and stepfather. "11
On February 4, 1994, pursuant to a warrant issued by the Pennsylva-
nia Board of Probation and Parole ("Board"), three parole officers ar-
rested Scott for violating his parole. 112 The alleged violations included
103. See I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.1(f), at 18-24 (discussing various proposed purposes of
the exclusionary rule); Fleissner, supra note 90, at 1025-27 (discussing Professor Packer's models
of the criminal justice system and their impact upon the exclusionary rule); Norton, supra note
28, at 264-70 (discussing the justifications for the exclusionary rule).
104. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (giving examples of cases employing the Ca-
landra rationale for the exclusionary rule).
105. Scott III, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
106. See id. at 2018.
107. See id. at 2022.
108. See Scott 11, 698 A.2d 32, 32 (Pa. 1997).
109. See id. One condition of Scott's parole was to consent expressly to any search of his per-
son, property, and residence. See id. Another condition of Scott's parole was that he refrain from
assaultive behavior. See id. at 33. Finally, Scott was not to consume any alcohol. See id.
110. Id. at 32.
111. See id. at 33.
112. See id. The officers' knowledge of Scott's parole status forms one primary distinction
between Justice Thomas's majority opinion and Justice Souter's dissent. See infra Parts III.C,
ILI.E. Justice Thomas largely ignores the parole officers' knowledge of Scott's parole status, and
Justice Souter notes that the knowledge of a parolee's status increases the deterrent effect of the
rule. See infra Parts III.C, III.E (discussing Justice Thomas's opinion and Justice Souter's dis-
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possession of a .22 Magnum revolver on September 4, 1993 and a 10-
millimeter Glock handgun in September of 1993.113 At the time of his
arrest, Scott had no weapons in his possession. 114
Before being transported to the county correctional facility, Scott
gave his keys to the arresting agents. 115  When the agents arrived at
Scott's residence, no one was home. 116  Upon the return of Scott's
mother, the officers informed her that they were going to search Scott's
bedroom, neither requesting nor receiving consent. 117 After they found
no evidence of a parole violation in his room, the officers then searched
the sitting room adjacent to Scott's room.118 They found five firearms
underneath a sofa and a compound bow and three arrows in a closet.119
B. Administrative and Lower Court Decisions
On March 30, 1994, a parole violation hearing was held before an
administrative law judge ("AL").120  When asked to explain the legal
justification for the search, Agent Mundro responded:
[A]ny individual under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole can have his residence searched by representa-
tives of the Board with or without the homeowner's permission if this
is the parolee or probationer's approved residence. I was merely in-
forming [Scott's] mother that we were going to search . . . . We also
have the right to search any common living areas in the residence. 121
sent).
113. See Scott 11, 698 A.2d at 33. The officers also had information that Scott had consumed
alcohol and been involved in a fight. See id. The other violations, however, were not at issue in
Scott's appeal. See id. at 33 n.1.
114. See id. at 33. In Scott 11, the court described Scott's parole violation as possession of
weapons in his "approved residence," not on his person. See id. at 33 n.2.
115. Seeid. at33.
116. See id. The officers instructed Scott's companion, Dorothy Hahn, to lead them to Scott's
residence. See id. When they arrived, Hahn called Scott's mother. See id.
117. See id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the consent form that Scott signed
was not a waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 36. Accordingly, the court held the
search to be unreasonable. See id.
118. See id. at 33. Scott's mother directed the agents to his room. See id.
119. See id. The guns were not loaded and the officers did not find any ammunition. See id.
In his defense, Scott testified that he did not know the guns were in the home because his mother
had told him they had been removed. See id. at 34. Scott's stepfather also testified that the guns
belonged to him and he had hidden them, knowing they were not permitted in Scott's approved
residence. See id. The administrative law judge, nevertheless, held that this testimony was ir-
relevant under the terms of Scott's parole. See id.
120. See id. at 33.
121. Id. The United States Supreme Court had previously addressed the question of whether
parolees retain Fourth Amendment liberty interests upon release. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 879-80 (1987) (holding that special needs of law enforcement in the parole context
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The ALJ admitted the evidence resulting from the search over the ob-
jection of Scott's counsel, ruling that the consent, though unusual, was
valid. 122 On June 6, 1994, the Board recommitted Scott to serve thirty-
six months backtime.123
Scott then appealed the decision of the Board to the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania. 124 The commonwealth court applied the Calan-
dra balancing test1 25 but held that the exclusionary rule was applicable
in the context of a parole revocation hearing. In so holding, the com-
monwealth court reasoned that the deterrent effect of the rule would
substantially outweigh any injury to Pennsylvania's interests that would
result from an exclusion of the evidence. 126
The Commonwealth appealed the lower court's decision to the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania. 127  After concluding that the search of
Scott's residence violated the Fourth Amendment, 128 the Pennsylvania
coupled with the diminished liberty of parolees justified an exception, in a particular factual con-
text, to the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment); Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-90 (1972) (holding that parolees do possess liberty interests,
although diminished).
122. See Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 668 A.2d 590, 595 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1995) [hereinafter Scott 1]. The transcript states:
[Tihe issue is on the record. My finding regarding this issue is that there were-that
the consent-that the search (INAUDIBLE) was a bit unusual but within requirements
so established for consent by residences of parolees by parole agents and the Com-
monwealth. So let's go forward having resolved the issue of the search.
Id. (citing Record at 79-80).
123. See Scott H, 698 A.2d at 34. The primary evidence on which the Board relied was the
possession of the weapons. See id. The Board also noted that there was sufficient evidence to
support a violation for consumption of alcohol. See id. On September 6, 1994, the Board modi-
fied its previous decision by adding two aggravating factors: (1) that Scott had committed multi-
ple violations; and (2) that Scott should be considered a threat. See id.
124. See Scott 1, 668 A.2d at 594. The commonwealth court held that the consent form signed
by Scott was invalid and the search unreasonable. See id. at 597 & n.3.
125. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Calandra balancing test).
126. See Scott 1, 668 A.2d at 600. The court noted that although many states have refused to
apply the exclusionary rule, some states have applied the rule in special circumstances. See id. at
599. The court reasoned that the sole purpose of the search was to uncover evidence of additional
violations occurring after Scott's arrest. See id. at 600. Therefore, the court concluded that the
exclusionary rule was necessary to deter searches such as this one, despite the injury to the tradi-
tionally flexible parole system. See id.
127. See Scott 11, 698 A.2d at 34. During the period pending review, the commonwealth court
filed an en banc opinion in a separate case holding that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to
parole revocation hearings. See Kyte v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 680 A.2d 14, 18
n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). The court held that the deterrent effects of the rule were outweighed
by its cost in the parole revocation context. See id. at 17-18. Therefore, in Kyte, the court refused
to apply the exclusionary rule. See id. at 18.
128. See Scott 11, 698 A.2d at 39. The court reasoned that the consent form signed by Scott
pursuant to his parole merely acknowledged that the parole officer has the right to conduct rea-
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Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the officer's knowledge
of a suspect's parole status. 129 The court reasoned that when an officer
is unaware of a suspect's status as a parolee, the officer's primary goal
would be to garner evidence for a criminal trial, not a parole revocation
hearing. 130 Therefore, the court conceded that when an officer is un-
aware of a suspect's parolee status, application of the exclusionary rule
at a parole revocation hearing would be unnecessary given the deterrent
effect stemming from the possible exclusion of evidence at a criminal
trial. 1
3 1
When an officer is aware of the suspect's status, however, the court
held that the purpose of the search would be quite different. 132  The
court hypothesized that an officer aware of the suspect's parole status
may seek evidence of parole violations, rather than evidence of criminal
activity. 133 The court stressed that successful parole revocation hearings
produce the same end result as a successful criminal trial-incarceration
of the parolee. 134  The court concluded that the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence, in criminal trials, would have an insufficient deter-
rent effect upon an officer aware of the suspect's parole status. 135
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, therefore, upheld the lower court's
sonable searches. See id. at 35-36. Because neither officer who conducted the search recalled the
source of information, the court held the search was based on mere speculation and, thus, was
unreasonable. See id. at 36.
129. See id. at 36-37. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished its decision from Kyte,
as well as the majority of federal circuit courts that have held that the exclusionary rule did not
apply in the context of parole revocation hearings. See id. at 34-38. The court distinguished
Scott's case, noting that some of the federal circuit courts that had addressed the applicability of
the exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings had not been confronted with the factual sce-
nario in which officers were aware that the suspect was a parolee. See id. at 37 n.9.
130. See id. at 37.
131. See id. at 37-38.
132. See id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted decisions in both the Ninth and Second
Circuits. See id. (citing United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Win-
sett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975)). The Ninth Circuit wrote:
[W]hen the police at the moment of search know that a suspect is a probationer, they
may have a significant incentive to carry out an illegal search even though knowing
that evidence would be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding. The police have
nothing to risk: If the motion to suppress in the criminal proceedings were denied, de-
fendant would stand convicted of a new crime; and if the motion were granted, the de-
fendant would still find himself behind bars due to revocation of probation.
Winsett, 518 F.2d at 54 n.5, quoted in Scott 11, 698 A.2d at 37.
133. See Scott 1H, 698 A.2d at 37-38.
134. See id. at 38.
135. See id. Without the protection of the exclusionary rule, there would be "nothing to deter
a parole agent from conducting an illegal search .. " Id.
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opinion, and the Commonwealth appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. 1
3 6
C. Opinion of the Supreme Court
Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Thomas reversed the deci-
sion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 137  The Court initially dis-
missed the notion that the exclusionary rule is a remedy for the govern-
ment's violation of a Fourth Amendment right. 138  Subsequently, the
Court embraced the inference that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
was to deter illegal searches and seizures. 139 Having concluded that the
purpose behind the exclusionary rule was to serve as a deterrent, not as
a remedy, the Court concluded that the rule was not constitutionally
mandated. 140 As such, the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule is
applicable only when its deterrent benefits outweigh its social costs. 14 1
The Court also recognized that it had previously refused to apply the
exclusionary rule in noncriminal proceedings due to the costs associated
with the rule. 142 Likewise, the Court recognized that it had previously
136. See id.; see also Scott III, 118. S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1998).
137. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2022. Joining Justice Thomas were Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. See id. at 2017.
138. See id. at 2019. The Court also noted that the use of illegally obtained evidence is not,
itself, a Fourth Amendment violation. See id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906
(1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976)). Instead, the Court reasoned that the Fourth
Amendment violation is "fully accomplished" by the illegal search. See id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S.
at 906). Therefore, the exclusion of evidence cannot operate as a cure for the invasion that the
defendant has suffered. See id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906).
139. See id. The Court wrote that the "exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means
of deterring illegal searches and seizures." Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 (1974)). Calandra first articulated this purpose for the rule and, thus, became the starting
point for limitations placed on the exclusionary rule. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying
text (discussing the purpose of the exclusionary rule and the development of the Calandra bal-
ancing test).
140. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2019. The Court stated that the rule does not "proscribe the
introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons .. " Id. (quot-
ing Stone, 428 U.S. at 486). Herein lies a fundamental, but arguably misstated, assumption that
the Court made about the purpose of the exclusionary rule. See supra Parts IIA-B (discussing the
purposes behind the exclusionary rule); see also infra Part IV.A. (criticizing the Court's distinc-
tion between the deterrent and remedial purposes behind the exclusionary rule).
141. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2019 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 907; United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 454 (1976); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348). The Court stated that the exclusionary rule
should apply only in contexts "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served." Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348). The Court thus sets forth the balancing test
first articulated by Calandra. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
142. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2019-21 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050
(1984) (declining to apply the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings); Leon, 468 U.S. at
907 (declining to apply the exclusionary rule when officers relied in good faith upon a warrant
which appears valid on its face); Janis, 428 U.S. at 447-48, 454 (declining to apply the exclusion-
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held that the rule's effect tends to be duplicative in noncriminal pro-
ceedings.
143
After discussing the purpose behind the exclusionary rule, the Court
noted that the application of the exclusionary rule in the parole revoca-
tion context may be similar to other noncriminal or administrative con-
texts where the Court chose not to apply the exclusionary rule.
144
Therefore, the Court invoked the Calandra balancing test.145 Using the
balancing test, the Court first examined the costs of applying the exclu-
sionary rule in the context of parole revocation. 146 The Court declared
that in this context, the rule imposes significant costs, limiting both the
truthfinding process 47 and law enforcement objectives. 148  Although
these social costs are identical in kind to those tolerated in application
of the rule during criminal trials, the Court posited that the social costs
are particularly high in the parole revocation context. 149 The Court first
reasoned that parolees are more likely to commit future crimes than av-
erage citizens. 150  In the eyes of the Court, the possibility that parolees
ary rule in civil tax proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-46 (declining to apply the exclusion-
ary rule in grand jury proceedings)).
143. See id. at 2019-20 (citing Janis, 428 U.S. at 448, 454).
144. See id. at 2020; supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing contexts in which
the Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule).
145. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2020; see also supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the application of the Calandra balancing test).
146. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2019-21. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted, the costs
associated with the application of the exclusionary rule in the parole revocation context are the
same, regardless of the officers' knowledge of the suspect's parole status. See Scott H, 698 A.2d
32, 38 (Pa. 1997).
147. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2020 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976)). The
Court did not suggest that this particular cost is associated only with parole revocation hearings.
See id. Instead, it reasoned that because the application of the exclusionary rule inherently exacts
a "costly toll," those pressing its application must meet a high burden. See id. (citing United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)).
148. See id. (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 490). The Court noted that, because of the high social
costs associated with application of the rule, it has generally held the rule to apply only in the
context of a criminal trial. See id. at 2020 n.4 (noting that, even in criminal trials, application of
the exclusionary rule is limited under certain circumstances).
149. See id. at 2020. The Court cited no evidence indicating that application of the exclusion-
ary rule heightens interference with truthfinding or law enforcement objectives in the parole revo-
cation context. See id. Instead, the Court examined the nature of parole. See id. It commented
that parole is a "variation on imprisonment." Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477
(1972)). Like imprisonment, the parolee is given a limited degree of freedom in exchange for
compliance with certain conditions. See id. One argument is that parole is only granted because
the state can condition the release of the parolee upon compliance with parole requirements. See
id. Therefore, the state has an "overwhelming interest" in ensuring that parolees comply with the
conditions of their parole. See id. (quoting Morrissey, 468 U.S. at 483).
150. See id. The Court cited no empirical evidence for this conclusion. See id. Instead, it
cited only to Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987). See id. (stating that "this is the very
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could avoid the consequences of noncompliance with their parole in-
creased the cost of applying the exclusionary rule.151
The Court also worried that application of the exclusionary rule im-
posed a cost upon parole revocation hearings themselves by altering the
nature of the proceedings. 152  The Court described parole revocation
hearings as both informal and flexible.153 Because of the flexibility and
informality of parole revocation hearings, a parolee is not entitled to the
"full panoply" of due process rights afforded a criminal defendant. 154
The Court concluded that imposition of the exclusionary rule upon pa-
role revocation hearings would undermine the informal, administrative,
and flexible nature of the proceedings. 155
Specifically, the Court reasoned that use of the exclusionary rule
would delay parole revocation hearings. 156 Drawing from the presump-
tion that the exclusionary rule would delay these hearings, the Court
reasoned that application of the exclusionary rule would then lead to in-
premise behind the system of close parole supervision").
151. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2020.
152. See id. at 2020-21. In Pennsylvania, parole boards conduct parole hearings. See 61 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 331.2 (West 1964 & Supp. 1999). The Board is composed of nine mem-
bers, appointed by the Governor. See id. To serve on the Board, a person must have at least six
years of experience in parole, probation, social work or related areas, including at least one year
of supervisory or administrative experience. See id. The Board has the discretion to recommit
parolees for technical violations after a hearing. See id. at § 331.21 (West Supp. 1998). The Su-
preme Court has commented that most states have adopted informal and administrative hearings
in order to accommodate the large number of parole hearings. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2021.
153. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2021. The Court additionally commented that parole hearings
are not entirely adversarial. See id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973)). In-
stead, the Court characterized parole hearings as "predictive," "discretionary," and "factfinding."
Id. (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787). This flexibility and informality, to some extent, is neces-
sary to accommodate the heavy volume of parole revocation hearings faced by most states. See
id.
154. See id. at 2021 n.5 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480). The Court recognized that differ-
ent rules of evidence apply in parole revocation hearings than criminal trials. See id. at 2021
(citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). Likewise, the Court commented that the right to counsel
does not attach to parole proceedings. See id. at 2021 n.5 (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787).
155. See id. at 2021.
156. See id. Here, the Court cited no empirical evidence to support its presumption; instead, it
offered two analogies. See id. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule often requires col-
lateral litigation to determine the admissibility of evidence. See id. It offered, as examples, its
decision to refuse to apply the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings or grand jury
proceedings. See id. (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1984); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974)). The Court noted that grand jury proceedings would be
delayed by the exclusionary rule because "[s]uppression hearings would halt the orderly process
for an investigation and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to
the grand jury's primary objective." Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349). The Court, how-
ever, did not offer an explanation of why such delay is as harmful to parole revocation hearings as
it is to either grand jury or deportation hearings. See id.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 31
creased financial cost. 15 7 Thus, the Court concluded that the application
of the exclusionary rule would transform parole revocation hearings
from a flexible, fact-finding expedition that could promote the parolee's
best interests to an adversarial, trial-like proceeding. 158
After emphasizing the social costs associated with the exclusionary
rule, the Court downplayed the deterrent effect of the rule. 5 9 The Court
stressed that the exclusionary rule need not apply in contexts where it
provides only "marginal deterrence."'160  The Court separated its analy-
sis of the potential deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule into two
parts: (1) an analysis of the effect of the rule upon police; 161 and (2) an
analysis of the effect of the rule upon parole officers.
162
With respect to its analysis of the effect of the rule upon police, the
Court first suggested that the focus of a police officer's search is ob-
taining convictions rather than ensuring compliance with parole.
163
From this suggestion, the Court concluded that even when the police of-
ficer knows of the parolee's status, the officer would be deterred from
157. See id. The Court even went so far as to suggest that states, knowing the possibility of
protracted litigation over the admissibility of evidence, would be less likely to offer parole be-
cause of budgetary concerns. See id. Again, however, the Court offers no empirical, or even
analytical, evidence for this conclusion. See id.
158. See id. (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787-88).
159. See id. at 2021-22. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the cost of the ex-
clusionary rule would be the same regardless of the officer's knowledge of a suspect's parole
status, but that the benefit of applying the rule would be significantly increased when the officers
were aware of their suspect's parole status. See Scott H1, 698 A.2d 32, 38 (Pa. 1997); see also su-
pra notes 128-135 and accompanying text. The majority minimized, without explanation, the
distinction made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2021-22. In-
stead, the majority treated the issue simply as whether the exclusionary rule has benefits in the
parole revocation context. See id. at 2021-22.
160. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350; Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). Intertwined with the Court's analysis of the possible deterrent
effect of the rule, the Court reiterated the increased cost of collateral litigation associated with the
exclusionary rule. See id. The Court wrote that "a piecemeal approach to the exclusionary rule
would add an additional layer of collateral litigation regarding the officer's knowledge of the pa-
rolee's status." Id. The Court did not appear to provide evidentiary support for the contention
that this layer of collateral litigation would hinder the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose. See
id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. The Court relied only on a statement made in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 458 (1976). See id. In Janis, the Court held admissible illegally seized evidence in civil tax
proceedings. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 458 (stating that the noncriminal proceeding "falls outside
the offending officer's zone of primary interest"). The Court did not further explain why gather-
ing evidence of parole violations also falls outside the officer's zone of interest. See Scott 111, 118
S. Ct. at 2022.
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conducting illegal searches because the exclusionary rule would be ap-
plied in criminal trials. 1
64
The Court next asserted that even if a parole officer conducted the
search, the deterrent effect of the rule would nonetheless, be limited.
165
The Court distinguished the motives of parole officers from police offi-
cers, characterizing the parole officer's role as supervisory, rather than
adversarial. 166 The Court proposed that other remedies, such as depart-
mental discipline or damage actions, would provide sufficient deter-
rence for parole officers, making the application of the exclusionary rule
in parole revocation hearings unnecessary. 167  Finally, the Court de-
clared that, like police officers, parole officers would be aware of the
possibility of suppression of evidence in a criminal trial and that aware-
ness provided sufficient deterrent effects. 168 Therefore, Justice Thomas
164. See Scott II, 118 S. Ct. at 2022. The Court did not provide any empirical or anecdotal
evidence for this conclusory statement. See id. In addition, the Court did not address the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's proposition that an officer who is aware of his suspect's parole status
has inherently different motivations than an officer who is unaware of his suspect's parole status.
See id.; see also supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's analysis of how the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in criminal trials could
be insufficient when the officer is aware of the parolee's status).
165. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2022. The Court characterized the primary concern of the pa-
role officer as determining "whether their parolees should remain free on parole." Id. Police of-
ficers, on the other hand, are "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984)). Interestingly, the Court suggested
that it is the police officer's motivation of obtaining evidence for convictions at criminal trials
that makes the possible benefit from the exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings marginal.
See id. With parole officers, the Court seems to suggest that the absence of any motivation to
obtain evidence for convictions at criminal trials makes the possible benefit from the exclusionary
rule marginal. See id.
166. See id. at 2022 (relying on Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987)). The Court
stated that it is "unfair to assume" that the parole officer is either hostile or impartial towards his
parolee. See id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972)). The Court even sug-
gested that a failure of the parolee translates to a failure of the supervisory officer. See id. (citing
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-86). The Court conceded, however, that parole officers do sometimes
violate the Fourth Amendment fights of their parolees but failed to cite to any empirical evidence
about the frequency of such violations. See id.
167. See id. The Court, however, did not explain why such remedies are sufficient in the
context of parole revocation hearings, but not in the context of criminal trials. See id. Neither did
the Court provide any empirical or anecdotal evidence that supported its conclusion that the
remedies it proposed would be effective. See id. The Court did not address the conclusion in
Mapp v. Ohio that other remedies were largely ineffective. See supra notes 47-50 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the purposes behind the exclusionary rule).
168. See Scott I1, 118 S. Ct. at 2022. The Court did not acknowledge either the dissent or the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's distinction that evidence of parole violations often leads only to a
parole revocation hearing rather than a criminal trial. See id.; see also supra notes 132-136 and
accompanying text (discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis of how the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule in criminal trials could be sufficient when the officer is aware of
the parolee's status).
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concluded that neither police officers nor parole officers would be suffi-
ciently deterred from conducting searches in violation of the Fourth
Amendment by an application of the exclusionary rule in parole revo-
cation hearings. 169
Justice Thomas wrote that the exclusionary rule is a "grudgingly
taken medicant. ' 170 Consistent with that philosophy, Justice Thomas
concluded that the exclusionary rule would disrupt the parole revocation
hearing process. 171 Likewise, Justice Thomas minimized any possible
deterrent effect the rule would have in the parole revocation context.
172
Accordingly, under the Calandra balancing test,173 the Court held that
parole boards are not required to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
174
D. Justice Stevens's Dissent1 75
Justice Stevens's dissent is but three sentences in length, 176 yet it
challenged Justice Thomas's opinion by arguing that the exclusionary
rule is constitutionally required in parole revocation hearings. 177  The
exclusionary rule, Justice Stevens admitted, is not an explicit constitu-
tional right.178 Instead, Justice Stevens urged that the exclusionary rule
is a constitutionally mandated remedy that is necessary to ensure that
the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment are "observed in fact."' 1
79
169. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2022.
170. See id. (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 n.29 (1976)).
171. See id.; supra notes 152-158 and accompanying text (describing Justice Thomas's analy-
sis of how parole revocation hearings might change if the exclusionary rule applied).
172. See Scott II, 118 S. Ct. at 2022; supra notes 159-169 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Thomas's minimization of the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule in parole revoca-
tion hearings).
173. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Calan-
dra balancing test).
174. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2022.
175. There are two dissents from the majority opinion. Justice Stevens proposed that the ex-
clusionary rule is a constitutionally required remedy. See id. at 2023 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, attacked the assumptions of the majority
concerning the Calandra balancing test. See id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 2022-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stewart, supra note 24, at 1389) (citing Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18-19 & n.l (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 978 n.37 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 828 &
n.22 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
178. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stewart, supra note 24, at 1389). Stevens did
not cite to language in Weeks v. United States, which supports this argument. See id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (noting language in Weeks that
supports the proposition that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally required remedy).
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While Justice Stevens did not rehash arguments he had put forth in pre-
vious dissents, he based his dissent on a common premise-that in
drafting the Bill of Rights, the Framers, "identif[ied] values that may
not be sacrificed to expediency."' 180 In doing so, Justice Stevens en-
dorsed a purpose for the exclusionary rule wholly separate from the de-
terrent purpose recognized by both Justice Thomas and Justice
Souter. 18 1 Justice Stevens determined that the exclusionary rule exists
to preserve the right to privacy mandated by the Fourth Amendment.' 
82
E. Justice Souter's Dissent
Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice Souter utilized the Calandra balanc-
ing test to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies in the con-
text of parole revocation hearings. 183 Justice Souter criticized the ma-
jority's reasoning, suggesting that it rested upon mistaken
characterizations of the function of parole revocation hearings and the
motives of those who gather evidence in support of petitions to revoke
parole. 184 Consequently, Justice Souter argued that the majority both
underestimated the deterrent effect the exclusionary rule would have in
the parole revocation context 185 and overstated the social costs that
would result from the application of the rule.
186
Justice Souter's criticism of the majority's reliance on the deterrent
180. Leon, 468 U.S. at 979-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens put forth two primary
arguments in his Leon dissent. See id. at 979-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). First, he argued that it
is commonplace for courts to exclude certain kinds of evidence, even though it may be probative.
See id. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He provided examples such as the marital privilege, attor-
ney-client privilege, and doctor-patient privilege. See id. at 979 n.38 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (John T. McNaughton rev., 1961)). Second, Justice
Stevens reasoned that the police would not have had the evidence but for the illegal search. See
id. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the cost of applying the rule is not so great as
the majority concluded. See id. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's proposi-
tion that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional searches); infra note 185
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's claim that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter unconstitutional searches).
182. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. See Scott 11, 118 S. Ct. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter wrote that "[t]he
exclusionary rule does not.., mandate the exclusion of illegally acquired evidence from all pro-
ceedings or against all persons .. " Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
184. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule in criminal prosecutions should serve as a baseline for comparing the deterrent effect
the rule would have in other contexts. See id. at 2023-24 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984)).
186. See id. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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effect of the exclusionary rule began with an analysis of Justice Tho-
mas's comparison of the parole revocation context to the contexts of the
grand jury and civil tax proceedings. 187 The majority reasoned that the
exclusionary rule was not applied in other noncriminal proceedings and,
thus, should not be applied in parole revocation proceedings where the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule would be similar. 1
88
Justice Souter, in contrast, distinguished parole revocation hearings
from grand jury and civil tax proceedings. 189 Although Justice Souter
agreed that application of the exclusionary rule in either grand jury or
tax proceedings would be duplicative, 190 he charged that this was not
the case in the context of a parole revocation hearing. 191 Justice Souter
stressed that the function of a parole revocation hearing is the same as
that of a criminal trial-to return a parolee to prison. 192  In addition,
Justice Souter then observed that a parole revocation hearing often takes
the place of a formal criminal trial.193 The logical conclusion, Justice
187. See id. at 2024 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)). Justice Thomas compared the potential deter-
rent benefits of the exclusionary rule, if applied in the parole revocation context, with the poten-
tial benefits, if applied in grand jury and civil tax proceedings. See id. at 2020 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); see also supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis
of the cost of applying the exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings).
188. Justice Thomas noted that the primary similarity was that none of the proceedings were
criminal trials. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's conclusion
that parole revocation hearings are similar to other noncriminal proceedings).
189. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2023-25 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter posited that civil tax proceedings are so
attenuated from criminal proceedings that the possibility of exclusion of evidence in such pro-
ceedings provides little deterrent effect to an officer whose primary interest is state criminal
prosecution. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). This, Justice Souter proposed, provided the logic for
the conclusion that police officers will not be motivated to gather evidence for a civil tax pro-
ceeding. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Souter recognized that an investigation
that sought only to produce evidence for a grand jury would be "so unambitious" that it would be
a rarity. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice Souter concluded that, in the context
of both civil tax proceedings and grand jury hearings, the application of the rule in the criminal
trial does provide significant deterrence. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (referring to Calandra,
414 U.S. at 351; Janis, 428 U.S. at 457-58); see also supra note 143 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the contexts in which application of the exclusionary rule would be duplicative).
191. See Scott lIl, 118 S. Ct. at 2024 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter provided several examples of cases where
the state sought revocation of parole when the criminal prosecution was dismissed for insufficient
evidence. See id. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing State ex rel Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole
Auth., 661 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ohio 1996); Anderson v. Virginia, 457 S.E.2d 396, 397 (Va. 1995);
Chase v. Maryland, 522 A.2d 1348, 1350 (Md. 1987); Gronski v. Wyoming, 700 P.2d 777 (Wyo.
1985)). In addition, Justice Souter noted that the Supreme Court observed that a parole revoca-
tion hearing is "often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of recommit-
ting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972)). Finally, Justice Souter referred to a
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Souter argued, is that an officer investigating a parolee will not always
be deterred by the fear of evidentiary suppression in a criminal trial.' 94
Justice Souter also criticized the majority's characterization of the
motives of both police and parole officers. 195 He first attacked the fac-
tual predicate of Justice Thomas's argument-that a police officer is
concerned with investigating crimes and is likely to be unaware of a
suspect's parole status. 196  If a police officer, even in the investigation
of a crime, has identified a suspect, Souter contested, he likely will be
aware of the suspect's parole status. 197 Starting from this very different
set of facts, Justice Souter reasoned that, precisely because an investi-
gating officer knows of his suspect's parole status, he will be concerned
about the outcome of a parole revocation hearing. 198 Therefore, Justice
Souter concluded that application of the exclusionary rule during crimi-
nal trials and not during parole revocation proceedings was not suffi-
cient to deter unconstitutional searches. 1
99
treatise that states that parole revocation hearings are used in place of criminal proceedings. See
id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, §
8.06, at 386) (1993)).
194. See id. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 2024-25 (Souter, J., dissenting). The majority characterized police officers as
concerned primarily with criminal investigation and parole officers as concerned primarily with
ensuring parole compliance. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text. From this charac-
terization, the majority concluded that police officers would be unconcerned with the possible
exclusion of evidence at parole revocation hearings and parole officers would be immune from
the kind of "competitive zeal" that would cause them to violate the Fourth Amendment in the first
place. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text. Justice Souter commented that because
police often cooperate with parole officers, it is inappropriate to characterize them differently, as
did the majority. See Scott I11, 118 S. Ct. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing PENNSYLVANIA
BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, POLICE PROCEDURES IN THE HANDLING OF PAROLEES 16
(1974) (directing parole officers to inform police in the area where parolee will be living and to
cooperate with the police)).
196. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing police officer awareness of
the parole status of someone being searched).
197. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2024 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter's dissent cited a number
of court of appeals and state appellate court cases that document instances in which an investi-
gating officer testified to awareness of a suspect's parole status. See id. at 2024-25 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing Grimsley v. Dodson, 696 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel.
Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1217 (2d Cir. 1971); People v. Montene-
gro, 173 Cal. App. 3d 983, 986 (4th Dist. 1985); State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.,
661 N.E. 2d 728, 730 (Ohio 1996); People v. Stewart, 610 N.E. 2d 197, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)).
198. See id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that police officers are em-
ployed by the same sovereign that runs the parole system. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1984)) (stating that deterrence is "especially effec-
tive when law enforcement and prosecution are under one government"). Finding empirical evi-
dence regarding parole investigations is, however, inherently difficult. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note
24, § 1.2(b), at 31.
199. See Scott II1, 118 S. Ct. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned that be-
cause parole revocation hearings often substitute for criminal trials, and because officers aware of
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The Souter dissent next criticized the majority's characterization of
the motives of parole officers. 200 Justice Souter reasoned that a parole
officer's interest in the outcome of parole revocation hearings created a
motive that is far from neutral.2°' Instead of focusing solely upon the
parolee's constructive return to society, a parole officer wears several
hats-those of counselor, social worker, prosecutor, and law enforce-
ment official.20 2 Furthermore, the Souter dissent observed that a parole
officer who fails to respond to a parolee's criminal behavior, or who
brings a petition without sufficient evidence, jeopardizes both public
safety and his career. 20 3 Hence, as with police officers, the dissent con-
cluded that the possibility of exclusion during criminal trials, but not pa-
role revocation hearings, is an insufficient deterrent for parole offi-
cers.
20 4
The Souter dissent disputed the majority's assertion that other deter-
rents would provide sufficient force to prevent parole officers from
violating the Fourth Amendment. 20 5  Although the majority suggested
that departmental training, internal discipline, and actions brought by
parolees for monetary damages provide sufficient deterrence, 20 6 it of-
fered no examples of such training or discipline and found no lawsuit
seeking damages for an illegal search.20 7
the suspect's parole status develop new motivations, the possibility of exclusion at criminal trial
was too remote to provide an effective deterrent for unconstitutional searches. See id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
200. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The majority characterized parole officers as more inter-
ested in making sure the parolee is rehabilitated than in catching parole violators. See supra notes
166-69 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's description of the role of parole offi-
cers).
201. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter contended that it
is inaccurate to paint a parole officer as one "immune to such competitive zeal." Id. at 2025
(Souter, J., dissenting). Accordingly, parole officers are subject to a similar "temptation to cut
constitutional corners." Id. at 2025-26 (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, LAW OF
PROBATION AND PAROLE § 11.04 (1983)) (explaining that parole officers serve as prosecutors and
law enforcement officials in their relationship with parolees); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420
(1983) (holding that a probation officer is allied with other peace officers); TIMOTHY P. WILE,
PENNSYLVANIA LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 5.12, at 88 (1993) (noting that parole offi-
cers act as supervisors, social workers, advocates, police officers, investigators, and advisors).
203. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing R. Prus & J. Stratton, Pa-
role Revocation Decisionmaking: Private Typings and Official Designations, 40 FE D.
PROBATION 51 (Mar. 1976)).
204. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
205. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The majority grudgingly admitted that parole officers did
not zealously adhere to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 2022.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, which concluded that other remedies were not
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Having found that the majority opinion underestimated the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule if applicable in parole revocation hear-
ings, the Souter dissent next debated the majority's estimates of the so-
cial costs associated with such an application. 20 8  Justice Souter did
concede, as the majority argued,2° that the application of an exclusion-
ary rule in the parole revocation context would tend to diminish the in-
formality of parole revocation hearings while increasing their adversar-
ial nature.210 Nevertheless, Justice Souter contended that this was not a
sufficient reason to abandon the exclusionary rule. 211 Likewise, Justice
Souter criticized the majority's conclusion that the application of the
exclusionary rule would be too cumbersome for lay parole boards to ap-
ply.212 For these reasons, Justice Souter concluded that adoption of the
exclusionary rule would not, as the majority suggested, so transform pa-
role revocation hearings as to mandate the rejection of the rule. 213
Finally, Justice Souter challenged the majority's hypothesis that use
of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings would levy a
costly toll upon the State's interest in reducing crime. 214 Justice Souter
did not contest the majority's assumption that the state has an "'over-
whelming interest' in ensuring that its parolees comply with the condi-
tions of their parole, given the fact that parolees are more likely to
commit future crimes than average citizens."215 Instead, Justice Souter
commented that the exclusionary rule imposes a cost upon the fact-
finding function of any proceeding. 216  Consequently, Justice Souter
suggested that the state's interest in convicting criminals is better served
sufficient to deter unconstitutional searches).
208. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2026-27 (Souter, J., dissenting).
209. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's concern that
the application of the exclusionary rule may make parole revocation hearings more formal and
inflexible).
210. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2026-27 (Souter, J., dissenting).
211. See id. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that although parole revoca-
tion procedures are commonly held without the use of lawyers, counsel must be provided when
the factual issues are complex. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 787 (1973)).
212. See id. at 2026-27 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned that lay board mem-
bers would be just as capable of deciding Fourth Amendment issues as police, who are "charged
with the responsibility for the legality of warrantless arrests, investigatory stops, and searches."
Id. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting).
213. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
214. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the social costs of the exclusionary rule).
215. Scott I11, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the majority opinion).
216. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice Souter commented that the cost of
the exclusionary rule remains the same whether the forum is a parole revocation or a criminal
trial. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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by conditioning the parole on an agreement to submit to warrantless
searches, 217 rather than refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in the pa-
role revocation context.
218
Just as Justice Thomas's opinion focused on the impact that the ex-
clusionary rules would have on the parole revocation system,219 Justice
Souter reasoned that without a suppression remedy in the parole revo-
cation context, nothing will adequately deter parole and police officers
from violating a parolee's Fourth Amendment rights.220 Accordingly,
Justice Souter concluded that the exclusionary rule should apply in the
parole revocation context.
221
IV. ANALYSIS
Scott III represents a new exception the Court has carved from the
exclusionary rule. 222 The Court determined, utilizing the balancing test
it formulated in 1974,223 that the benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule in parole revocation hearings did not substantially outweigh the
costs associated with the rule's application. 224 The decision is troubling
for two reasons. 225 First, while the application of the balancing test has
become commonplace in exclusionary rule jurisprudence, 226 neither the
217. With this suggestion, Justice Souter raised the very issue that the majority declined to
address-whether the consent form signed by Scott made the search a reasonable one. See id. at
2029 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra note 68 (discussing the effectiveness of search
consent forms).
218. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
219. See supra Part I.C (discussing the majority opinion in Scott III).
220. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter commented that
the parole revocation hearing is often the only forum in which illegally obtained evidence will be
used. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, the exclusionary rule will provide the only deterrence
to unconstitutional searches when law enforcement officers seek to re-incarcerate a parolee. See
id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
221. See id. at 2028 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also stated that the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania found the consent form signed by Scott to be inadequate. See id. (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (citing Scott 11, 698 A.2d. 418, 426 (Pa. 1997)). Therefore, Justice Souter would have
held the search to be unreasonable. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 2022; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (listing other exceptions to
the exclusionary rule and limitations upon the Fourth Amendment).
223. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974). The balancing test weighs the
cost associated with the exclusionary rule against the deterrent benefit of the rule. See id. The
Calandra Court identified the injury to the role and function of the grand jury as a type of cost.
See id. at 349-50. The benefit was the deterrence of searches in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See id. at 350-5 1.
224. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2022.
225. See infra Parts IV.A-B (discussing the Court's misstatement of the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule and the Court's misapplication of the Calandra balancing test).
226. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-10 (1984) (stating that the deterrence ra-
tionale was the sole justification for the exclusionary rule); Norton, supra note 28, at 270-80 (dis-
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majority opinion 227 nor Justice Souter's dissent 228 fully explored the
underlying proposition supporting this test-that the exclusionary rule
serves only a deterrent purpose.229  On the other hand, Justice Stevens
proposed, but provided no detailed analysis, that the underlying pur-
poses of the exclusionary rule should be reexamined.23° Second, even
assuming that the Calandra balancing test should continue to be used,
the majority's application of the test is unconvincing because it both ex-
aggerated the social costs associated with the exclusionary rule231 and
understated the deterrent effect of the rule.232 The majority opinion suf-
fers from improper analogous comparisons, assumptions grounded upon
neither empirical nor anecdotal evidence, deficient considerations of the
factual context of this case, and incomplete descriptions of the kind of
deterrent effect the exclusionary rule could have. 233 Moreover, the ma-
jority's framing of the issue before the Court exacerbated these flaws. 234
cussing the development of the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule).
227. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2019 (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348); see also supra Part
III.C (detailing the majority's decision).
228. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at
347); see also supra Part III.D (explaining Justice Stevens's criticism of both the majority opin-
ion and the Souter dissent).
229. See Fleissner, supra note 90, at 1027-28 (crediting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) with providing a judicial integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule); Norton, supra note
28, at 284-86 (arguing that deterrence need not be viewed as the only justification for the exclu-
sionary rule); Stewart, supra note 24, at 1381-87 (arguing that the exclusionary rule serves more
than a deterrent purpose). Justice Stewart contends that the responsibility for enforcing the Con-
stitution's limits upon government rests with the judiciary. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1384.
Consequently, Stewart maintains that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated judicial
remedy to give effect to the Fourth Amendment's protections. See id.
230. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2022-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. See infra Part IV.B.1 (criticizing the majority's analysis of the exclusionary rule's cost if
applied in parole revocation hearings).
232. See infra Part IV.B.2 (suggesting the majority underestimated the deterrent benefit of the
exclusionary rule when applied in parole revocation hearings).
233. See infra Parts IV.B.1-2 (analyzing the flaws in the majority's application of the Calan-
dra balancing test).
234. The majority chose to address the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should apply in
parole revocation hearings. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2017-18. Justice Souter, however, framed
the issue as whether the exclusionary rule should apply in parole revocation hearings where the
officers conducting the search are aware of the suspect's parole status. See id. at 2024-25 (Souter,
J., dissenting); see also supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's
criticism of the majority's choice in presenting the issue). Indeed, the Court's choice in framing
the issue is reminiscent of Bowers v. Hardwick where the Court's framing of the issue dictated
the result. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (where the Court framed the issue
as whether homosexuals had a constitutional right to engage in sodomy, rather than whether sex-
ual activity between consenting adults is within the sphere of the right to privacy); see also Ste-
phen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. "Process, " 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313,
341 n. 143 (1999) (discussing the art of Constitutional issue framing and Bowers).
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A. The Court Misstated the Purpose Behind the Exclusionary Rule
Underneath the surface of exclusionary rule jurisprudence lies a de-
bate over the supposed purposes behind the rule. 235 Since its inception,
the reason for the creation of the exclusionary rule has never been ex-
plicitly stated.236 As such, the exclusionary rule is subject to shifting
judicial philosophies and paradigms. 237 The rule has been characterized
as a constitutional mandate, 238 a guardian of judicial integrity, 239 a con-
stitutional remedy,24° and a vehicle to deter unconstitutional searches.
241
Justice Stewart has argued that the rule is neither directly mandated
by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments nor necessary to preserve judicial
235. See Fleissner, supra note 90, at 1025-27 (discussing Professor Herbert L. Packer's defi-
nition of the paradigms governing the criminal justice system); Norton, supra note 28, at 283-86
(summarizing the debate over the purposes of the exclusionary rule); Stewart, supra note 24, at
1381-87 (discussing the debate over the purposes of the exclusionary rule). Norton comments
that this debate suffers from "empty assertions of deontological rights theory" and claims that are
difficult to support with empirical evidence. Norton, supra note 28, at 283-84 (quoting Robert
Weisberg, IVHS, Legal Privacy, and Legacy of Dr. Faustus, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 75, 79-80 (1995)).
236. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary
rule), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wasowicz, supra note 26, at 79 (noting
the absence of any legislative or judicial debate over the efficacy of the exclusionary rule prior to
its creation by Justice Day).
237. See supra notes 30-35, 48-50, 53-57, and accompanying text (discussing the implicit
purposes of the exclusionary rule expressed in Weeks, Mapp, and Calandra); see also 1 LAFAVE,
supra note 24, § 1.1(f), at 18-23 (discussing purposes behind the exclusionary rule); Fleissner,
supra note 90, at 1025-26. Fleissner discusses Professor Herbert L. Packer's definition of the
dominant paradigms-the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model-of the criminal
justice system. See Fleissner, supra note 90, at 1025-26. Fleissner argues that Packer's descrip-
tion of the Crime Control Model provided an impetus for the formation of the deterrence ration-
ale. See id.
238. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1380-81. Justice Stewart cites language from cases
throughout the history of exclusionary rule jurisprudence to support this rationale for the exclu-
sionary rule. See id. Justice Stewart, however, ultimately rejects this rationale because the Fourth
Amendment contains no explicit language regarding the exclusion of evidence. See id. at 1381.
239. See Fleissner, supra note 90, at 1028; Norton, supra note 28, at 268-69 (discussing lan-
guage in Weeks supporting the theory that the rationale behind the exclusionary rule is one of ju-
dicial integrity). As support for this theory, Norton quoted Hughes v. State: "Security from un-
lawful search is the right guaranteed to the citizen ... This right we must protect, unless we may
with impunity disregard our oath to support and enforce the Constitution." Norton, supra note
28, at 269 (quoting Hughes v. State, 238 S.W. 588 (Tenn. 1922) (internal quotations omitted)).
240. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1384 (arguing that the exclusionary rule is a constitution-
ally mandated remedy). Justice Stewart contends that the responsibility for enforcing the Con-
stitution's limits upon government rests with the judiciary. See id. Consequently, Stewart main-
tains that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated judicial remedy to give effect to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. See id.
241. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (stating that the purpose of the
rule is to deter); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-10 (1984) (stating that the de-
terrence rationale was the justification for the exclusionary rule).
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integrity. 242 Instead, Justice Stewart proposed that the exclusion of evi-
dence is a constitutionally required remedy to vest Fourth Amendment
rights.243 Since 1974, however, the Supreme Court has consistently re-
lied on the fourth justification for the rule-that it served to deter un-
lawful searches and seizures-to the exclusion of the other purposes.244
Both the majority and the Souter dissent merely accepted the rationale
that the rule serves only a deterrent purpose.245 The issue appears to be
resolved-the pendulum of jurisprudence has swung towards the fourth
alternative.
246
Yet, the issue warrants more than this casual dismissal. Both the ori-
gins and development of the exclusionary rule indicate that it served
something beyond a deterrent purpose. 247 The Weeks Court, in its ex-
planation of the newly formed rule, noted that the rule should apply to
"all, alike," and if it did not, that the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment might as well be "stricken from the Constitution. '" 248 The Court
continued to espouse this theoretical framework behind the rule through
1961, when Justice Clark stated that without the exclusionary rule the
Constitution would be reduced to a mere form of words. 249 Indeed, the
Court went so far as to say that the exclusionary rule was "part and par-
cel" of the Fourth Amendment. 2
50
242. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1381-83 (rejecting both the constitutional mandate and the
judicial integrity rationales for the exclusionary rule as problematic).
243. See id. at 1383-89 (suggesting that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally required
remedy). Justice Stewart sat on the Court when it applied the exclusionary rule to the states and
provided a clearer statement of the purposes of the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); see also supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's pur-
pose in adopting the exclusionary rule in Mapp).
244. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354 (stating that the purpose of the rule is to deter); see also
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908-10 (stating that the deterrence rationale was the justification for the exclu-
sionary rule).
245. See Scott I11, 118 S. Ct. at 2019 (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348), 2023 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347). On the other hand, Justice Stevens repeats his
opinion that the rule should be a constitutionally required remedy. See id. at 2022-23 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
246. See supra note 57 (listing cases relying upon the Calandra balancing test).
247. See supra notes 33-37, 49-52, and accompanying text (discussing the origins and devel-
opment of the exclusionary rule and implicit discussion of its purpose); see also Fleissner, supra
note 90, at 1028 (discussing purposes of the exclusionary rule implicit in the language of Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
248. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392-93.
249. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Justice Clark also referred to the lan-
guage in Weeks, which stated that without the exclusionary rule, the language of the Fourth
Amendment might as well be stricken from the Constitution. See id. (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at
383).
250. See id. at 651.
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The Scott III Court discussed neither Mapp nor Weeks.251 Instead, it
cited the case credited with the development of the balancing test,
claiming that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created means of de-
terring illegal searches and seizures." 252 Even in creating the Calandra
balancing test, however, the Court did not refer to Mapp or Weeks to
support its holding that the exclusionary rule served only to deter.253
Critics argue that the Calandra balancing test is arbitrary. 254 -They
maintain that the test creates the appearance of an objective scale upon
which the empirical evidence is weighed.255 In the absence of empirical
evidence, however, the image becomes a mirage. 256 The Mapp Court
concluded that other remedies were largely ineffective deterrents for
unconstitutional searches. 257 In light of Mapp's conclusion, Justice
Stewart's suggestion that the rule serves as a constitutional remedy to
give effect to the Fourth Amendment merits reinvestigation.
258
B. The Scott III Court Misapplied the Calandra Balancing Test
Even though the Scott III Court determined that the Calandra bal-
ancing test was the appropriate standard to determine the applicability
of the exclusionary rule, the Court's use of this test rested upon un-
founded assumptions and flawed logical conclusions. The Court con-
cluded that the exclusionary rule, if applied in parole revocation hear-
ings, would have an enormous social cost 259 and would not deter
251. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2018-22 (1998) (making no mention of the language of
Mapp or Weeks).
252. Id. at 2019 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
253. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354 (making no reference to language in Mapp or Weeks when
stating that the purpose of the rule is to deter, not remedy).
254. See I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.3(b), at 57 (citing Justice Brennan's comment that the
exclusionary rule engenders decisions supported by "intuition, hunches, and occasional pieces of
partial and often inconclusive data") (citation omitted).
255. See id.
256. See id. § 1.3(c), at 57. LaFave quotes Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall on the sub-
ject of exaggerated costs:
we have not been treated to an honest assessment of the merits of the exclusionary rule,
but have instead been drawn into a curious world where the 'costs' of excluding ille-
gally obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the 'benefits' of such
exclusion are made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand.
Id. (citation omitted).
257. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of other reme-
dies in deterring unconstitutional searches).
258. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2022-23 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
purpose of the rule should be to provide a constitutional remedy to give effect to Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees); Norton, supra note 28, at 283-94 (advocating a reexamination of the purpose of
the exclusionary rule).
259. See supra notes 146-58 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court's analysis of the
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unconstitutional searches.2 60 Both conclusions are erroneous.261
1. The Court Overstated the Social Cost Associated with the Rule
The Court first contended that because parolees are more likely to
commit future crimes than the average citizen, the state has an over-
whelming interest in ensuring parole compliance. 262 While the factual
predicate to this conclusion may be valid, the Court did not explain how
this cost differs, either in degree or in kind, from the interest in obtain-
ing convictions during criminal trials. 263 The exclusionary rule is a bit-
ter pill.264 When it is applied, those who are guilty of crimes often go
free.265 It is inherently inconsistent with the goal of truth finding within
the judicial process. 266 Nevertheless, it has been created to safeguard
the Fourth Amendment.267
The Court's contention that the exclusionary rule would transform
the nature of parole revocation hearings suffers from similar prob-
costs of the exclusionary rule).
260. See supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text (examining the Court's cursory analysis
of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule).
261. See infra Parts IV.B.l-2 (criticizing the Court's application of the Calandra balancing
test).
262. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's statement re-
garding the state's interest in ensuring parole compliance).
263. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (noting Justice Souter's analysis that the
costs described by the Court are simply those born whenever the exclusionary rule is applied); see
also I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.6 (g), at 182 n.1 19 (citing United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d
1205 (4th Cir. 1978) (commenting that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule in the parole
revocation context are not significantly higher than those in criminal trials).
264. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.2(a), at 25. LaFave writes that the exclusionary rule
"makes the cost of honoring the Fourth Amendment apparent." Id. The exclusionary rule is only
used after incriminating evidence has been illegally obtained and "'flaunts before us the cost we
must pay for [F]ourth [A]mendment guarantees."' Id. at 25-26 (quoting Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1974)).
265. Justice Harlan wrote that "[wie do not release a criminal from jail because we like to do
so, or because we think it is wise to do so, but only because the government has offended consti-
tutional principle in the conduct of his case." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
266. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1392-93 (discussing modem criticisms of the exclusionary
rule); see also I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.2 (addressing recent attacks upon the exclusionary
rule).
267. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1383-89 (arguing that the exclusionary rule serves to pre-
serve the protections of the Fourth Amendment); see also Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at
Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 321-22. Justice Traynor wrote:
[iut was one thing to condone an occasional constable's blunder, to accept his illegally
obtained evidence so that the guilty would not go free. It was quite another to condone
a steady course of illegal police procedures that deliberately and flagrantly violated the
Constitution of the United States as well as the state constitution.
Id. at 322.
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lems. 268  The exclusionary rule makes any proceeding more adversar-
ial. 269 The Court again does not explain how this cost differs, in degree
or in kind, from the cost associated with the rule in criminal trials.
270
Rather than identify costs associated with the exclusionary rule that are
particular to parole revocation hearings, the Court simply outlined the
basic costs that are always associated with the rule.
27
'
Even if the Scott III Court's proposed "overwhelming State interest"
in ensuring parole compliance is accepted, there exists a far less intru-
sive method of meeting this interest. 272 In the past, the Court adopted a
lower Fourth Amendment standard for reasonable searches to comport
with governmental interests in specific situations.273 The Scott III Court
presented an argument to condition parole on consent to searches, not to
deny the application of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation hear-
ings. 2
74
2. The Scott III Court Understated the Benefits Derived from
Applying the Exclusionary Rule in Parole Revocation Hearings
The Court's conclusion that the benefits derived from applying the
exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings would be marginal is
also unconvincing. 275  The Court's primary contention that application
268. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's contention that
the rule would destroy the informality of parole revocation hearings).
269. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's argument
that the effect of the rule is to make any proceeding more formal); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note
24, § 1.6 (g), at 183 (stating that this argument has lost its force since parolees must be afforded
due process rights in the revocation process).
270. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's criticism of
the majority's argument); see also I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.3(c), at 58 (noting that the ex-
clusionary rule is applied in only 0.6% to 2.35% of all criminal cases).
271. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's criticism of
the majority's argument).
272. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (suggesting that one less intrusive
method is to condition a grant of parole upon an agreement to submit to warrantless searches); see
also Harvard Article, supra note 68, at 189-91 (suggesting that the Court should first have ex-
amined whether or not the search was reasonable because of Scott's consent).
273. See supra note 72 (listing cases where the Court has a diminished expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment).
274. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's argument
that the majority presents only a reason to condition parole upon consent to warrantless searches);
see also Harvard Article, supra note 68, at 189-90 (criticizing the Court for not deciding this
threshold issue before applying the Calandra balancing test). Indeed, the Court's refusal to de-
termine whether the Pennsylvania consent form was valid seems to violate the Ashwander rule,
which provides that a Court shall decide a case on the narrowest ground possible. See Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
275. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's position that the
deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings would be marginal).
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of the exclusionary rule in the parole revocation context would be du-
plicative and have little deterrent effect 276 rests not upon empirical or
even anecdotal evidence, but upon misplaced analogies and assumptions
about the motivations of police and parole officers. 277 The Court also
failed to explore fully. the factual context in which this case arose.278
Finally, the Court presented only a limited description of all possible
manners in which the rule might deter unconstitutional searches. 279
The Court's opinion that police officers would not be concerned with
parole revocation hearings 280 largely ignored the fact that parole revo-
cation hearings, like criminal trials, effectuate a parolee's return to
prison.281  Furthermore, because parole revocation proceedings have
lower standards of proof and are administratively more expedient than
criminal trials, they are often the sole proceeding parolees receive be-
fore being returned to prison.282  In addition, parole violations are
rarely, in and of themselves, criminal offenses. 283 Because police offi-
cers not only are aware of the parolees in their community,284 but also
276. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's contention that appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings is duplicative); see also I LAFAVE,
supra note 24, § 1.6 (g), at 180-81 & nn. 112-13 (citing numerous instances where lower courts
have held that application of the exclusionary rule is not duplicative in parole revocation hearings
when the officer conducting the search is aware of the suspect's status).
277. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Souter's analysis of
the majority's assumptions about police officers).
278. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's criticism of
the majority to fail to fully consider the officer's knowledge of Scott's parole status).
279. See infra notes 303-06 and accompanying text (discussing the educative deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule).
280. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (characterizing the police officers as un-
concerned with parole hearings).
281. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's observation that
the effects of parole revocation and criminal trials are similar).
282. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972). The Supreme Court noted that a
parole revocation hearing is "often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease
of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State." Id. In addition,
Justice Souter refers to a treatise on parole that states that parole revocation hearings are used in
place of criminal proceedings. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2027 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 8.06, at 386 (1983)).
283. See Scott 11, 698 A.2d 32, 33-34 (Pa. 1997). The ALJ found parole violations such as
consumption of alcohol and possession of firearms-neither of which were criminal offenses.
See id.
284. See, e.g., Grimsley v. Dodson, 696 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cit. 1982); United States ex rel.
Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2d Cit. 1971); People v. Montene-
gro, 219 Cal. Rptr. 331, 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Stewart, 610 N.E.2d 197, 205-06 (Ii.
App. Ct. 1993); State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 661 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ohio
1996)). Particularly illustrative is Wright, where police officers knew the suspect was a parolee
and asked his parole officers to conduct the search of his residence. See Wright, 661 N.E.2d at
730. This suggests that police deliberately cut constitutional corners with respect to parolees,
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cooperate with parole officers to maintain parole compliance, their mo-
tivation is not exclusively to obtain evidence in preparation for criminal
trials.285  Consequently, because parole revocation hearings may replace
criminal trials, the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect of prohibiting il-
legally obtained evidence to be used at a criminal trial decreases. 286
The Court's second assumption, that parole officers would have neu-
tral, supervisory relationships with their parolees that would insulate
them from the "temptation to cut constitutional corners," 287 is incom-
plete at best.288 Although one role of the parole officer is, without a
doubt, to supervise and assist their parolees, another role is to enforce
the conditions of parole.289 In Pennsylvania, parole officers are consid-
ered by law to be police officers with respect to the offenders under
their jurisdiction. 290  Although the Court insisted that other remedies,
such as departmental training, discipline, and the threat of damage ac-
tions, provide effective deterrents for Fourth Amendment violations, it
did not provide a single citation to any internal regulations, disciplinary
proceedings, or damage actions to support its assumption.291  Indeed,
the Court's decision here flies in the face of the decision in Mapp v.
Ohio, where the Court specifically held that these kinds of deterrents
knowing that the evidence would be admissible at the parole revocation hearing. See id.
285. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's dissent in
Scott III in which he criticized the majority's characterization of police motives). Justice Souter
cites the Pennsylvania Probation and Parole handbook, directing parole officers to cooperate with
police. See supra note 195.
286. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1389. Justice Stewart commented that officers' infringe-
ments of the Fourth Amendment are not motivated by "condemnable malice," but by "commend-
able zeal." Id. Justice Stewart concluded that a remedy is needed to ensure that an officer con-
tains his enthusiasm and complies with the Fourth Amendment. See id.
287. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's characteri-
zation of parole officers).
288. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's observation that a
parole officer does not have a neutral interest in parole revocation hearings). The Supreme Court
has commented that "a probation officer is a peace officer and as such is allied, to a greater or
lesser extent, with his fellow police officers." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 432 (1984)
(quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 720 (1979)); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.6
(g), at 180 & n. 110 (commenting that if a parole officer made the search, deterrence is necessary
because the parole officer's primary concern will be whether the parole shall be revoked, not
whether the parolee will be convicted of a new offense).
289. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (describing the various hats that parole offi-
cers wear).
290. See T. WILE, PENNSYLVANIA LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 5.12, at 89; see also 1
LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.6 (g), at 182 (postulating that investigations of parole violations are
"cooperative efforts ... [where] ... police and parole officers frequently work together to reim-
prison the suspect").
291. See Scott 111, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2022 (1998).
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were not effective. 292 If internal regulations, discipline, and threats of
damage actions were effective deterrents, it would seem the exclusion-
ary rule would be entirely unnecessary for parole and police officers
alike. 293
The Court's contention that the exclusionary rule applies only in the
context of a criminal trial294 is also mistaken because the Court's analo-
gies are misplaced. 95 A parole revocation hearing is not a civil pro-
ceeding but part of the criminal process. 296 The comparison to civil tax
and deportation hearings falls short because defendants in civil tax and
deportation hearings simply do not face the same loss of liberty faced in
a parole hearing. 29
7
The comparison to grand jury proceedings also falls short but for dif-
ferent reasons. The parole revocation proceeding, unlike grand jury
proceedings, occurs after a trial has concluded and is the last step before
deprivation of liberty by re-incarceration. 298 In contrast, grand jury pro-
ceedings are but one step before a trial.299 Consequently, the Court's
292. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's conclusion in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that no remedy other than the exclusionary rule would effec-
tively deter searches). Justice Stewart commented that states have created other remedies in ad-
dition to the exclusionary rule, but "no state official has contended that the existence of these al-
ternative remedies, many of which have been extended greatly in the years since Mapp, obviates
the need for an exclusionary rule." Stewart, supra note 24, at 1388. See generally 1 LAFAVE,
supra note 24, § 1.3(d) (discussing the understated benefits of the exclusionary rule).
293. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.3(d), at 62 (criticizing the United States v. Leon
Court's conclusion that the rule would not have a deterrent effect on persons other than police
officers). Indeed, the ruling in Scott 11 extends the reasoning of Leon, which held that neutral
magistrates would not be deterred by the exclusionary rule. Compare Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2022
(holding that parole officers would not be deterred by the application of the exclusionary rule),
with Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916-17 (1984) (holding that there is no reason to believe that neutral
magistrates would be inclined to ignore the Fourth Amendment).
294. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (citing examples of the Court's refusal to ap-
ply the exclusionary rule in noncriminal proceedings).
295. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. The Court compares parole revocation
hearings with grand jury, civil tax, and deportation proceedings. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2020-
21. The Court does little more than present the analogy, engaging in no illustration of the logic
connecting the cases. See id.
296. See I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.6(g), at 179 & n.104 (listing a parole revocation hear-
ing as a criminal proceeding).
297. Compare Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2018 (stating that the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole sentenced defendant Scott to serve 36 months backtime), with INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1035-36 (1984) (ordering deportation to Mexico of defendants Lopez-Mendoza
and Sandoval-Sanchez).
298. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2018 (effectuating the re-incarceration of defendant Scott im-
mediately after the parole revocation hearing).
299. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 340-42 (1974) (making no final adjudica-
tion of guilt resulting from the grand jury proceeding).
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conclusion that the application of the exclusionary rule in a parole revo-
cation hearing would be duplicative is erroneous.
300
Finally, the Court neglected to fully consider the possible deterrent
impact of the exclusionary rule. 30 1 The Court ascribed only one manner
in which the rule would deter unconstitutional searches-through its
punitive effect.30 2 A second manner, however, has been proposed.30 3
The exclusionary rule deters because it alters the institutional culture of
those it affects. 3°4  In other words, the rule compels education about
Fourth Amendment standards. 30 5  Although only sparse empirical evi-
dence exists regarding the possible educative deterrent effect of the rule,
the Court neglected to even consider that the rule could serve such a
purpose.3
06
300. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's argument
that application of the exclusionary rule at parole revocation hearings would not be duplicative);
see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.6(g), at 180-81 & nn. 112-13 (citing decisions where ex-
clusionary rule was held not to be duplicative).
301. See Scott I1, 118 S. Ct. at 2021-22 (discussing only the deterrent effect of the exclusion-
ary rule upon individual officers and not upon the law enforcement institution itself); see also
infra note 321 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Scott III on the Fourth Amend-
ment).
302. See supra notes 160-169 and accompanying text. The Court characterized the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule as one that deters unconstitutional searches through fear of the ex-
clusion of evidence at trial. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text
303. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.3(d), at 64. LaFave argues that the exclusionary rule
serves a deterrent effect by encouraging institutional reform and conformity with the Fourth
Amendment. See id.
304. See id. Justice Brennan wrote:
If the overall educational effect of the exclusionary rule is considered, application of
the rule to even those situations in which individual police officers have acted on the
basis of a reasonable but mistaken belief that their conduct was authorized can still be
expected to have a considerable long-term deterrent effect. If evidence is consistently
excluded in these circumstances, police departments will surely be prompted to instruct
their officers to devote greater care and attention to providing sufficient information to
establish probable cause when applying for a warrant, and to review with some atten-
tion the form of the warrant that they have been issued, rather than automatically as-
suming that whatever document the magistrate has signed will necessarily comport
with Fourth Amendment requirements. After today's decisions, however, that institu-
tional incentive will be lost.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 955 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
305. See Fleissner, supra note 90, at 1032. "The language of deterrence tends to obscure an
important result of the Exclusionary Rule, that of creating incentives for law enforcement agen-
cies to train officers to avoid constitutional violations." Id.
306. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2018-20; see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.2(b), at 30
(noting that evidence of increased warrants, increased efforts to educate police on search and sei-
zure law, and the creation of working relationships between police and prosecutors support the
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as an educative deterrent).
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The exclusionary rule is not popular. 30 7 There are calls for both se-
vere restrictions and its outright elimination. 30 8 Nevertheless, the Court
has yet to overturn the rule, and Congress has yet to legislatively elimi-
nate it.309 The arbitrariness of the Calandra balancing test allows the
Court to restrict the exclusionary rule under the guise of objectivity.310
Thus, the Scott III Court had the room both to overstate the costs asso-
ciated with the rule and to understate its deterrent benefit. 311
V. IMPACT
At a minimum, the Scott III decision means that the exclusionary rule
will not be used in parole revocation hearings. 312 This, however, is only
the beginning of the decision's impact.313 Scott III limited the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule and, hence, diminished the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. 314  This is not a new trend, but another step in a
steady stream of Supreme Court decisions which limited the rule's ap-
plication.315  Some of the decisions that diminished the scope of the
Fourth Amendment did so by restricting the category of governmental
actions identified as unreasonable searches. 316 Other decisions have,
307. See I LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 24 (noting that the exclusionary rule is "under
attack"); see also Fleissner, supra note 90, at 1033-42 (predicting expansion of the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule).
308. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 1397-1403 (analyzing proposals to modify the exclusion-
ary rule). But see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.2(c), at 34-38 (criticizing suggestions for re-
placing the exclusionary rule); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitu-
tional Law: "Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1616-23 (1996)
(criticizing arguments to abandon the exclusionary rule in favor of other remedies).
309. See Fleissner, supra note 90, at 1034-36 (noting the failed attempts of legislators to
eliminate the exclusionary rule and replace it with monetary damage awards for Fourth Amend-
ment violations).
310. See Norton, supra note 28, at 280 (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 (1995) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule allows "adjudica[tion] by hunch")).
311. See supra Part IV.B. (discussing the Scott III Court's misapplication of the exclusionary
rule).
312. See Scott I11, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2022 (1998).
313. See infra notes 319-20 (discussing how the decision has created a new group of people to
whom the Fourth Amendment applies differently).
314. See Scott I, 118 S. Ct. at 2022; see also Harvard Article, supra note 68, at 191-92
(criticizing decision for restricting Fourth Amendment protections).
315. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (listing cases that have restricted Fourth
Amendment protections).
316. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing cases lowering Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standards).
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instead, directly limited the application of the exclusionary rule. 317 Scott
III falls into the second of these categories. 318
The deeper effect of Scott III is to create a class of persons, parolees,
for whom the Fourth Amendment applies differently.319 Because deci-
sions of the Court have created different standards for Fourth Amend-
ment protections for public school students, persons at international
borders, and persons who are being deported, the decision in Scott III is
not unusual. 320 Scott III, however, used a different vehicle to create the
class for whom the Fourth Amendment applies differently.32'
With students and persons at international borders, the Court lowered
the standard for reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment,
rather than refusing to adopt the exclusionary rule.322  In doing so, the
Court provided compelling justifications for the deprivation of lib-
erty. 3
23
A state's authority under parens patriae,324 combined with the state's
interest in creating environments conducive to learning justified lower-
ing the Fourth Amendment standard for students in public schools.
325
317. See supra Part Il.C.2 (discussing cases restricting application of exclusionary rule).
318. Justice Thomas declined to decide whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
that the search was unreasonable was decided under state or federal law. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct.
at 2019 n.3.
319. See id. at 2022 (holding that exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation hear-
ing). But see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.6(g), at 182-83 (arguing that the exclusionary rule
should protect parolees in parole revocation hearings).
320. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-42 (1985) (holding that
searches of persons at international borders have a lower standard for reasonableness); New Jer-
sey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (holding that students have diminished liberty inter-
ests); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043-46 & 1051 (1984) (holding that the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings); see also supra notes 76 & 96 and
accompanying text (discussing categories of persons with lower Fourth Amendment protections).
321. Compare Scott HI, 118 S. Ct. at 2022 (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in pro-
ceedings which were part of the criminal process), with Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537-
42 (applying a lower standard for reasonableness for searches at international borders), T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 341-42 (finding diminished liberty interests), and Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1043-46
(declining to apply the exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding).
322. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537-42; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42. Again, this
raises the very issue Justice Thomas declined to reach-whether parole could be conditioned on
consenting to warrantless searches. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
323. Compare Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 537-42 and T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (ex-
amining liberty interest of students and persons at international borders), with Scott III, 118 S. Ct.
at 2018-22 (declining to examine liberty interest of parolees).
324. Here the author refers to parens patriae as the state's general interest in guarding its chil-
dren's well being. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
325. See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340-43. In T.L.O., the Court struck a balance between the di-
minished liberty interests possessed by students and the school's compelling interest in main-
taining an environment conducive to learning. See id.
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Similarly, the Court utilized the heightened need for safety at interna-
tional borders as a justification for a lower Fourth Amendment stan-
dard.3 26 The Scott III Court provided no such analysis to support its de-
cision.3
2 7
The refusal to apply the exclusionary rule in deportation hearings
provides the closest analogy to the restriction created in Scott 111.328
Even here, however, the analogy breaks down. First, persons deported
do not face the same deprivation of liberty as parolees. 329 Second, de-
portation hearings raise issues related to the seizure, rather than the kind
of evidentiary issues that arise in parole revocation hearings. 330  Most
importantly, the Lopez-Mendoza Court cited internal INS regulations
that are designed to safeguard the civil rights of persons who are sus-
pects for deportation. 33 1 In Scott III, the Court failed to adequately ex-
amine the effect of its decision on the Fourth Amendment rights of pa-
rolees.332
Scott III represents a different kind of limitation: one that not only
narrows the scope of the Fourth Amendment but also does so to the det-
326. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538-39. In Montoya de Hernandez, the Court
struck a similar balance, weighing the diminished interest at international borders with the gov-
ernment's interest in maintaining the integrity of its borders. See id.
327. See Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2018-22.
328. Compare Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2022 (examining the applicability of the exclusionary
rule in parole revocation hearings), with Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043-46 (examining the
applicability of the exclusionary rule in the deportation context).
329. Compare Scott III, 118 S. Ct. at 2022 (resulting in the re-incarceration of Scott after the
proceeding), with Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040, 1047 (resulting in the deportation of Lopez-
Mendoza and Sanchez-Sandoval after the proceeding).
330. In Lopez-Mendoza, Sanchez-Sandoval sought to suppress evidence from a statement
taken after an arrest that violated the Fourth Amendment. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1037.
At a deportation hearing, the government need only prove identity and alienage. See id. at 1039.
The Court noted that identity is non-suppressible and alienage may often be proven with inde-
pendently gathered evidence. See id. at 1043. The Court reasoned, using empirical evidence, that
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule would be minimal. See id. at 1043-45. Each INS
agent, the Court stated, makes about 500 arrests per year. See id. at 1044. Of these arrests, only
twelve proceed to some sort of hearing. See id. Of those, very few even challenge the circum-
stances of their arrest. See id. From this evidence, the Court concluded that the arrest record is a
trivial part of the deportation hearing and exclusion of evidence related to the arrest will have
only minimal deterrent effects. See id. at 1040, 1043-46.
331. See id. at 1044-45. The Court noted regulations that require that no one be detained
without reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage; no one could be arrested without an admission or
strong evidence of illegal alienage; training that included an examination on Fourth Amendment
law for new INS officers; Department of Justice policy that excluded evidence seized through
intentionally unlawful conduct; and an internal discipline procedure that punished Fourth
Amendment violations. See id.
332. See supra Part IV.B (discussing two erroneous conclusions in the Court's analysis of the
standard used to determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule).
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riment of a particular class of persons without adequate justification.333
Effectively, parolees no longer have Fourth Amendment protection.
334
If the kind of reasoning used in Scott III continues to dominate exclu-
sionary rule jurisprudence, we will create a society where some persons
are protected from governmental intrusions while others are not.33
5
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Scott III sets a dangerous precedent. The Su-
preme Court again refuses to swallow the bitter pill, further whittling
away Fourth Amendment protections. But the Court uses a sharper
knife this time. Instead of restricting the protections of the Fourth
Amendment in a particular context, the Court, in effect, has restricted
the protections of the Fourth Amendment for a particular class of per-
sons-parolees. Application of the cost-benefit balancing test rests
upon the assumption that the exclusionary rule serves only a deterrent
purpose. As a result, the Court's inquiry shifts away from the liberty
interest that has been invaded, to a cold and sparse set of empirical
facts. This inquiry makes it easier to restrict the protections of the
Fourth Amendment for a class of persons. To prevent the future erosion
of the Fourth Amendment, the Court should reexamine the underlying
purposes of the exclusionary rule so that its inquiry is refocused upon
the liberty interest that is invaded by the unconstitutional search.
PATRICK ALEXANDER
333. See supra notes 319-21 and accompanying text; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 487-90 (1972) (holding that parolees possess liberty interests and due process rights).
334. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing how the decision strips parolees
of their Fourth Amendment rights).
335. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 1.3(b), at 55-57 (criticizing the decision in United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), for creating the illusion of objectivity by shifting the inquiry away
from the constitutional question to questions of deterrence and cost-benefit analysis that are sup-
ported only by intuition and hunches).
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